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

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF VALUATION

DANIEL F. X. MEENAN, S.J.

Since John Dewey has, for weal or woe, given systematic expression to a way of life that has been characteristic and widespread in the American community almost from its inception, certainly from the time of the Industrial Revolution, his philosophy should be given the earnest attention of all American Catholic philosophers.

The present article is intended to serve as a help to this by giving in some detail the theory of valuation formulated by Dewey. A brief and rather general critique has been added to serve as a signpost and director for further discussion. In outlining Dewey's theory, an effort has been made to adhere as closely as possible to Dewey's own words and to give frequent page notations for easy reference on the part of the reader. This was done with the intention of giving as objectively as possible the thought of Dewey on value without any interpretation or comments of the writer intervening. Most of the content of this first part has been taken, naturally enough, from the single booklet of Dewey entitled *Theory of Valuation* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1939), though recourse has also been made to other works to develop or elucidate certain points.

I

Before embarking on an investigation of Dewey's theory of valuation, it will, perhaps, prove helpful to call to mind in brief outline the method he employs in this as in the rest of his philosophy.

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His method is what he calls "experimental empiricism." For Dewey, philosophy is essentially a criticism of socially important "beliefs." It emerges whenever a specific problem arises. And its function is to provide an answer to this problem. The method of criticism here referred to resembles that of scientific inquiry; that is, ". . . ventures of [a] theoretical sort [that] start from and terminate in directly experienced subject matter. . . . The vine of pendant theory is attached at both ends to the pillars of observed subject matter."[1] Hence, experience, subject to observation, is both the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of philosophic inquiry. Experience furnishes data for reflection and a means of testing the results of the reflection for a specific problem.

Inquiry, we are told, is a criticism of something specific within the broader setting of immediate experience, which always depends upon the immediate presence of directly experienced existential subject matters.

Experience is distinguished as "primary" or "gross," and "secondary" or "reflective"; and the function of each is thus stated:

> The subject matter of primary experience sets the problem and furnishes the first data of the reflection which constructs the secondary objects. . . .
>
> [The objects attained in reflection] *explain* the primary objects, they enable us to grasp them with *understanding*, instead of just having sense-contact with them. . . .
>
> . . . they are rendered continuous with the rest of nature and take on the import of the things they are now seen to be continuous with.[2]

In other words, primary experience is nonreflective; that is, it is the mere perception of objects, the given data upon which we build our knowledge. Through reflective experience we subject these data to inquiry so that we may come to understand them in their setting.

For Dewey, immediate experience has at least three different meanings: (1) the experience *out of which* knowledge arises; (2) the experience appealed to in at least two distinct stages in knowing; (3) the experience *to which* knowledge leads.[3]

Thus we see that Dewey's method begins from, and ends in, immediate experience; that is, observable data in a specific problem. There is, consequently, a rejection of all a priori concepts, purely logical

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[1]John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (2d ed.; La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Pub. Co., 1929), p. 2a.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 4.

[3]R. D. Mack, *The Appeal to Experience, Philosophic Method in Bradley, Whitehead and Dewey* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1945), p. 60.

constructions that have their conclusions beyond the level of observation, private experience that cannot be exposed to observation, and any form of pure idealism or of supernaturalism. Knowledge is only valid when it begins from observable data and leads to further, or new, observable data.[4] This, then, is Dewey's method of procedure.

The purpose of Dewey's theory of valuation is only to show *when,*— that is, under what circumstances—a valuation takes place, and not the ultimate why and how.[5] For him, value must be taken as a study of human acts, their causes and consequences. The word "value" always carries with it the implication of an existential relation between subject and object. And "intrinsic value" resides not in the object itself but in its relation as means to the end-value which is its consequence.[6]

The problem of valuation, according to Dewey, has received new direction and impulse since the elimination of value concepts from the science of nonhuman phenomena. Nature is no longer conceived to be what it is because of the presence in it of *ends* as representing *perfect* or complete being, which was the goal desired by all changes in nature. In those days when *ens, verum,* and *bonum* were identified, and this identification was taken to be an

> expression of the constitution of nature as the object of natural science, . . . there was no place for any *separate* problem of valuation and values, since what are now termed values were taken to be integrally incorporated in the very structure of the world.[7]

Now, with the elimination of all teleological concepts from the natural sciences, the problem of value assumes the status of a separate problem.

All human conduct, in the strictest sense of that term, as implying intelligence and will, involves valuations. The problem, then, is, What is the nature of value and can there be genuine propositions about values? In other words, is the proposition "This is good" a true proposition? The answer to this is affirmative. Valuations *do* make true propositions of appraisal.

> 1. There are propositions which are not merely about valuations that have actually occurred . . . but which describe and define certain things as good, fit, or proper in a definite existen-

[4]For a fuller discussion of Dewey's method, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 51-68.

[5]John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 60. Permission to quote from this work has kindly been granted by the publisher.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 41.

[7]*Ibid.*, p. 2.

tial relation: these propositions, moreover, are *generalizations* since they form rules for the proper use of materials.

2. The existential relation in question is that of means-ends or means-consequences.

3. These propositions in their generalized form may rest upon scientifically warranted empirical propositions and are themselves capable of being tested by observation of results actually attained as compared with those intended.[8]

Ends are not valued, or "prized," apart from means,[9] nor is there any existential difference between the "prizing" of an end and the "appraising" of a means.[10] A person, for instance, in considering the means to a desired end, sees that they entail too much sacrifice, even of other end-values, and this serves to modify his original desire and, hence, his valuation.

In view of this, "intrinsic" value considered apart from its relation to anything else and, hence, as absolute, is fallacious. There is, indeed, an "intrinsic" or "immediate" value. But this is shared by both so-called "instrumental" values and "end" values.

> . . . the relational character of the *things* that are employed as means does not prevent the things from having their own immediate qualities. . . . The notion that, when means and instruments are valued, the value qualities which result are only instrumental is hardly more than a bad pun. There is nothing in the nature of prizing or desiring to prevent their being directed to things which are means, and there is nothing in the nature of means to militate against their being desired and prized. In empirical fact, the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is not what he *says* about its preciousness but the care he devotes to obtaining and using the *means* without which it cannot be attained.[11]

Further, "inherent" value is synonomous and contemporaneous with the *act* of valuing: "If one has an ardent desire to obtain certain things as means, then the quality of value belongs to, or inheres in, those things."[12] The same holds also for "intrinsic values." And the phrase "extrinsic value," says Dewey, involves a contradiction in terms. "Relational properties do not lose their intrinsic qualities of being what they are because their coming into being is *caused* by something 'extrinsic.' "[13]

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Dewey, in rejecting mere desire and interest as a basis for a theory of valuation, distinguishes upon an empirical basis between what is desired and what is desirable:

> The desirable or the object which *should* be desired does not descend out of the a priori blue nor descend as an imperative from a moral Mount Sinai. It presents itself because past experience has shown that hasty action upon uncriticized desire leads to defeat and possibly to catastrophe. The "desirable," as distinct from the "desired," does not then designate something at large or a priori. It points to the difference between the operation and consequences of unexamined impulses and those of desires and interests that are the product of investigation of conditions and consequences.[14]

For Dewey, an end, or an "end-object," may be defined as a projection intended to fulfill some need or lack, to fulfill an absence that produces conflict in the existing situation as it stands. But this is a true desire, a true valuation, only when there is question of a human act, not a mere vital impulse or instinctive habit. Valuation occurs "if and when *desire* and an end-in-view[15] intervene between the occurrence of a vital impulse or a habitual tendency and the execution of an activity."[16] Valuation, then, always implies the presence of an intellectual factor—"a factor of inquiry"—for the end-in-view is formed and projected by the intellect as something that will supply the defect or make up the want.[17] And end-in-view cannot be separated from the conditions—that is, the means or instruments—by which it has been brought into existence.

> It is simply impossible to have an end-in-view . . . save upon the basis of some . . . consideration of the means by which it can be brought into existence. Otherwise there is no genuine desire but an idle fantasy, a futile wish.[18]

Dewey insists that there is no such thing as a "final" end in the sense of an object which is *desired for itself*. Rather, as each end-in-view is acquired, it in turn becomes the means to a further end-in-view, and so on.[19] This he calls the "continuum theory." Since this is true, no end should be considered as final, but as the consequence of an action; and this consequence shall have further consequences which

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[15] End-in-view is a "foreseen end" which will result from the performance of the proposed action. It is, in other words, a consequence of that action.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[19] See *ibid.*, Part VI, "The Continuum of Ends-Means," pp. 40-50.

must also be criticized in the original act of valuation. Therefore, the concept that "the end justifies the means" is both fallacious and dangerous. This is humorously illustrated by the example of Charles Lamb's essay on the origin of roast pork, in which the disproportion between the end and the means chosen to obtain that end are obvious. Here again, Dewey reverts to the meaning of "intrinsic." True it is that the *enjoyment* of the pork was immediate, but to "pass from the immediacy of enjoyment to something called 'intrinsic' value is a leap for which there is no ground."[20] An end always stands in relation to the means of which it is the consequence. Hence, if the object in question is valued, it is valued *in this relation;* that is, as mediated. Now the first time roast pork was enjoyed, it was purely accidental. There was no question of the setting up of an end acquired by the use of certain means. On subsequent occasions, however, the enjoyment *did* become an end-value, since it was projected and desired as the consequence of certain actions. It may now be said to be "intrinsic." It is here that Dewey draws his conclusion.

> The sole alternative to the view that *the* end is an arbitrarily selected part of actual consequences which *as* "the end" then justifies the use of means irrespective of the other consequences they produce, is that desires, ends-in-view, and consequences achieved be valued in turn as means of further consequences.[21]

There is, however, some justification for the use of the term "final value," but it has merely a logical force.

> A value is final in the sense that it represents the conclusion of a process of analytic appraisals of conditions operating in a concrete case, the conditions including impulses and desires on one side and external conditions on the other. Any conclusions reached by an inquiry that is taken to warrant the conclusion is "final" for that case.[22]

This does not mean that there is a *regressus ad infinitum* in the continuum theory, so that there is no point at which foresight can stop. For the conditions under which the formation of an end-in-view takes place are those of "need, deficit and conflict." The "value" of different ends is measured by their ability to *satisfy,* in its literal sense, existing wants. This is the point upon which foresight may rest. "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof, and sufficient also is the good that does away with the existing evil."[23] Therefore he concludes:

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 42. See also the following page for a fuller explanation of the theory of the *continuum* of ends-means.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

> The attained end or consequence is always an organization of activities, where organization is a co-ordination of activities which enter as factors. The end-in-view is that particular activity which operates as a co-ordinating factor of all other sub-activities involved. Recognition of the end as a co-ordination or unified organization of activities, and of the end-in-view as the special activity which is the means of effecting this co-ordination, does away with any appearance of paradox that seems to be attached to the idea of a temporal continuum of activities in which each successive stage is equally ends and means.[24]

What has been said does not constitute a complete theory of valuation, for "the theory of valuation is itself an intellectual or methodological means and as such can be developed and perfected only in and by use."[25] Since the practice of this theory does not exist in any adequate way, the above can only serve to outline a program to be undertaken. "The undertaking can be carried out only by regulated guidance of the formation of interests and purposes in the concrete."[26] Further, "the test of the existence of a valuation and the nature of the latter is actual behavior as that is subject to observation."[27]

Valuations, then, do exist in fact, and are capable of empirical observation, so that propositions about them are empirically verifiable.[28]

> Future valuations must grow out of existing valuations, subjected to critical methods of investigation that bring them into systematic relation with one another . . . [that is,] by examination of their respective conditions and consequences. This method of critical investigation is merely a carry-over from the methods that have proved so effective in the physical sciences.[29]

The practical difficulties in the way of converting this theory to a practical program are supplied by tradition, customs, institutions, and vested interests which escape the probing eye of empirical investigation, but are given intellectual status and prestige by a priori theories.[30] The gap between the humanistic and nonhumanistic subjects will be filled, and science will be shown as an operating unity in fact. "In this integration [science] is the supreme means of the valid determina-

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[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 54.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

tion of all valuations in all aspects of human and social life."[31]

To sum up Dewey's theory of valuation, the primary meaning of the word "value," he says, is verbal.[32] It may be defined as "an object that satisfies or fulfills certain conditions,"[33] and these conditions may be regulated by the natural sciences, independent of any absolute authoritarianism—"regulation [that will permit experimentation to be used effectively in social interests and affairs] will come very largely from the findings of the natural sciences."[34] The primary meaning of the word "value" is verbal because it primarily signifies a human act of cherishing that which is desirable. It expresses the *relation* established between the person valuing and the thing valued as conditioned by environing circumstances. "Objective value" has significance only in view of this relationship being established. To speak of an objective value is to say that an object *is* or *was* valued and not that the object is *capable of being* valued; that is, that it is appetible. Similarly the term "intrinsic value" expresses the notion that a value inheres in, or is intrinsic to, an object as modified by circumstances and the establishment of that relationship, and not a value that inheres in the object itself.

Not everything that is desired is desirable, has a value; but in many cases, the mere valuing of a thing because it is desired can be a sign of immaturity. The fact that something is desired only raises the *question* of its desirability.[35] Nor is mere enjoyment identified with value, for in many instances the fact that a thing is enjoyed or can be enjoyed is a danger signal to investigate whether it *should* be enjoyed.[36]

"Ends" are synonomous with "means" in that in any series of actions with a final (in the sense of concluding) end, each of the im

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[31]*Ibid.*, p. 66.

[32]Dewey maintains that the verbal use is confusing, and for that reason he substitutes a new word, "valuation," to be used now nominally, now verbally. In practice, however, the nominal use seems to be derivative. Cf. his *Theory of Valuation*, p. 6.

[33]John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929), p. 260. On p. 259 he defines value by "enjoyments which are consequences of intelligent action."

[34]*Ibid.*, p. 273.

[35]*Ibid.*, p. 260.

[36]*Ibid.* To be valued, enjoyment must be regulated—must be the product of intelligent action, not merely accidental or haphazard enjoyment. "Enjoyment becomes a value when we discover the relations upon which its presence depends. Such a causal and operational definition gives only a conception of value, not a value in itself. But the utilization of the conception in action results in an object having secure and significant value" (p. 259).

mediate acts becomes an end-in-view and is cherished in the same manner, though, perhaps, not to the same degree, as the "final" end. And when the particular end-in-view is achieved, it becomes a means to the next, and so forth. The "final" end itself also involves new consequences and becomes the means for obtaining objects that present themselves in view of these consequences. Hence, there is no difference between that which is "instrumentally" valued and that which is valued "in itself." A *regressus ad infinitum,* in which it would be impossible for foresight to fix on any point, does not occur because the end proposed provides a sufficient organization for the activities leading up to that point, and it is sufficient to have concern for removing the *existing* evil, which will thus be accomplished.

Valuations do not depend on introspection or the revelation of private experience which must be held suspect, but can be directly observed by reason of their consequences, though this observation may have to be extended over a period of time in order to establish true conclusions.

In establishing the valuation of a particular act we can form "presumptions" as to the consequences of that act—and their efficacy in satisfying existing wants—in view of past experience. But these presumptions are by no means absolute.[37] Similarly we shall only know the detailed effects of the rejection of present institutions and the establishment of the present theory of scientific approach only after we have actually made the substitution.[38]

II

There are many points in which Dewey's analysis agrees with that of St. Thomas, and these might even be at least partially adapted as an expression in modern terms of their own doctrine. However, any agreement between St. Thomas and Dewey must of necessity be superficial, for in fundamentals and in method they differ radically. For Dewey's method is that of "experimental empiricism," a method that has proved very successful in the physical sciences and is, indeed, the only method for them. When applied, however, to an essentially moral science such as is involved in arriving at a theory of valuation, such

[37]Cf. Joseph Ratner (ed.), *Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy* (New York: Modern Lib., 1939), Chap. XIV, "Intelligence in Morals," pp. 761-82.

[38]Dewey, *Quest for Certainty,* p. 276. In much the same words Dewey restates many of the points shown above as late as 1949 in the book edited by Ray Lepley, *Value, A Cooperative Inquiry* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 64-77.

a method is found to be seriously wanting. And to make use of this mode of procedure to exclude nonsensible conclusions is to fall into the very fault which Dewey abhors—for any such procedure must begin from an unproved and unprovable a priorism. This a priori principle is that all human phenomena can be measured by direct observation and, more fundamentally, that all of nature can be explained within nature. Father J. C. Murray, S.J., accurately observed the weakness of such procedure when he wrote:

> . . . the hypothesis of monist materialism is either a purely scientific hypothesis, adapted *ad hoc* for the severely limited purposes of scientific investigation of a particular set of phenomena, or else a piece of dogmatism. As the former, it is acceptable. As the latter, it is intolerable, even on purely scientific grounds . . .
>
> This line of critique itself would show, if developed, that [the scientist] is not under any proved necessity to live by science alone. After all his science has said all it has to say, the spiritualist and theist hypothesis is still open. In fact, science cannot close it save by illegitimate recourse to some non-scientific *a priori* absolute.[39]

Now, Professor Dewey, I believe, falls into that illicit dogmatism of which Father Murray speaks.[40]

Valuing itself is essentially an interior experience, not directly observable. But because Dewey depends so much upon observation, he fails to grasp this, at least in his writings, and arrives at the logical but impossible conclusion that there is no difference between the valuation of a means and the valuation of an end; in other words, between an instrumental value and a final value. Take, for example, the common experience in the matter, say, of a true friendship or of the love of a mother for her child. It is true that we can determine with some accuracy the actuality or validity of a valuation of this kind in another through empirical methods, but the intimate nature of the act cannot be laid bare through these methods. In both of these examples we see that the object is valued in and for itself. We can easily discern between our estimation of the means of preserving that friendship or the life of the child, from the manner in which we esteem the friend or the child. The conclusion, then, that means are

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[39]John Courtney Murray, S.J., "On the Necessity for Not Believing," *Yale Scientific Magazine*, Vol. XXIII, No. 5 (Feb., 1949). Permission to quote from this article has kindly been granted by the *Yale Scientific Magazine*.

[40]For Dewey as a monist, see James Feibleman, *The Revival of Realism* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 91 ff.

cherished in the same way as ends must be held as false, even though they may *observationally* seem equally dear.

The complete denial of absolutes in Dewey may possibly be the outcome of Dewey's reaction against the philosophy of his youth. He was educated in Hegelian idealism, and, becoming dissatisfied with the inadequacies of Hegel, seemed to identify all a prioris and absolutes with Hegel's philosophy; and hence he swung strongly away from these towards realism and strict empiricism. In connection with this reaction to absolutes, James Feibleman notes:

> Admittedly, many of the so-called absolutes in past philosophy have proved to be false, and this is the short-coming which Dewey is seeking to avoid. But from the observation that past pretensions to absolutism have proved fallacious, it cannot be argued that nothing is absolute.[41]

Such a contention is, however, fundamental to Dewey. Yet it is an impossible position. His notion of change, for instance, is used absolutely, and is, therefore, contradictory. For if the proposition "Everything changes" is applied to itself, it is seen that this too must undergo change.[42] Yet such a proposition is essential and absolute to his system. Similarly, Dewey's naturalism stems from the a priori absolute referred to above, that the world can ultimately be explained by the world, by sense observation.

Since we are interested here more with his theory of valuation than with a critique of his method, I shall pass on with only this incomplete examination, having pointed out some of the more important fallacies involved in it. From these have flowed many of his false conclusions.

Dewey has adopted the terms "value" and "valuation" to express exclusively the concept of an *existing* relation of a rational desire of a subject for some object. In this use of terms Dewey may be justified, nor does he disagree in substance with St. Thomas. For St. Thomas, the good, of which Dewey's concept of value is a part, is an analogous notion[43] which embraces all beings, having its source and perfection in the *summum bonum,* God.[44] In his analogous concept, St. Thomas says that the good signifies not only an existential relation, but also the possibility of such a relation between subject and object.[45] It is legitimate, even desirable, to have exact terminology

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[41] *Ibid.*, p. 96.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 5, a. 6 ad 3; I-II, q. 8, a. 2 ad 2; a. 3 ad 4.
[44] *Summa contra Gentiles,* I, cap. 41, 37, 50.
[45] *ST,* I, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1: ". . . bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile . . ."

for each important category of any broad concept. Therefore, it seems legitimate to have one term to signify a good which is *actually* desired by a man and another to signify the good in general, whether actually or only potentially desired. Such is the distinction between Dewey's term "value" and St. Thomas's term "the good."

Had Dewey accepted his term as merely signifying one aspect of the much broader concept of St. Thomas, there would be no difficulty in reconciling the two on this point. But since he does not recognize this as being so, Dewey is led to a misunderstanding, and, hence, to a rejection of the rest of St. Thomas's thought on the good. Thus, for example, he speaks of the old medieval concept of the identification of *ens* and *bonum* as being a thing of the past, no longer held to be true. Were he to accept St. Thomas's definition of the good as "that which is appetible" (and there is no reason why he should not, since St. Thomas remains consistent in this throughout), he would see that this was, and still is, true. The "identification" that Dewey belittles stems from the fact that every being, at least in so far as it exists, is good. Therefore, since *all* things are good, *ens* may be said to be identified with *bonum, secundum rem* but not *secundum rationem.*[46] Logically, then, they are diverse in the thought of St. Thomas as well as in modern thought.

Dewey further confuses the term "value" with the terms "good" and "end." Again, "good" and "end" are identical *secundum rem* insofar as only that which is a good in the Thomistic sense can be made an end. However, the two terms have different meanings in that not every good is made in actual fact an end. Because Dewey misunderstood this he rejects the notion of inherent good. In his example of the essay on roast pork, he maintains that there could have been no intrinsic value in roast pork the first time it was tasted because it was not made the object of desire, but the pleasure was found quite by accident. Now, according to St. Thomas, it is precisely the pleasure in this case that is the inherent value in the sense of "good." That this good was truly inherent, at least potentially, from the time of the first pig who happened near the first fire, I do not think Dewey would deny. Rather, what he means here is that there was no question of a final *end* or end-in-view, for in order to cause an operation or act—in order to be an end—the good must exist first in the intention of the actor.[47]

The saying of St. Thomas that the intelligibility of means is taken from the end towards which they are means brings us to the important

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[46] *Ibid., corp.*

[47] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1.

nd fundamental problem of absolutes in valuations and also in norality. Dewey fails to distinguish between genuine and absolute norms, engendered by the creative Intelligence for the good order of he universe, and social convention, engendered by the inclinations of particular era or generation, which can and should be modified according to existential requirements. Absolute norms, as such, are not rbitrarily assumed, but are the logical consequence of a theistic hilosophy. St. Thomas says: "The end itself is the rule of those neans which lead to the end."[48] Now, the end of every man is materially the same—happiness.[49] But it is God alone who is capable f rendering man happy by placing him in that state of perfection in hich happiness is to be found.[50] Since God is infinite intelligence, He ill order all things so that they might attain this end in their own egree. And since He Himself is infinite, unchanging—absolute—it ollows that the fundamental or *necessary* means whereby we shall ttain to Him shall also assume the proportions of being absolute, according to the saying that *ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex ine.*[51]

This system of absolute morality can be defended even from Dewey's wn philosophy. For, according to Dewey, when an end is set up, one ust look to the consequences of that end to see if they are in due roportion with the end desired. If the end is absolute and ultimately atisfying, the means cannot be out of proportion to it, for to say is is to contradict the notion that the end is ultimately satisfying. here need be, then, no essential difference in the *method* of both ie relative and absolute systems, for the relative system, in the gical order, involves the same structure of internal relations as the bsolute. And the "absoluteness" of the latter stems from the quality f the ultimate end. Even so, until this ultimate end is universally ealized, there can be little hope of anything more than a superficial nderstanding between the two parties. It is sufficient here to show at at least the absolute system must be held as logically consistent nd that it no more descends "out of an a priori blue," as Dewey says, an does the relative system. From this there is also evident the hilosophic importance of definitively establishing either the existence r nonexistence of a personal God, in seeking to find a *rapprochement* etween the two systems.

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[48] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 141, a. 6.
[49] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 7.
[50] *Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 5 ad 2.
[51] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 141, a. 6.

Dewey's thought that there is no "final" end can be adopted by the Christian philosopher, if he limits it to the things of this world. For all these things of the temporal order should be considered as "ends-in-view," which have further consequences; and these consequences ought to be considered in relation to our final end, which is God.

We may now proceed to a more general appreciation of Dewey's theory of valuation. His ethics, though in itself somewhat inconsistent, is, nevertheless, by no means crudely hedonistic. He sets up a rigid ascesis for cultivating the moral personality, one that requires frequent examinations of conscience and frequent calm meditations on intelligent motives for action, though he himself would probably shrink from the term. All one's actions are to be examined, not in the light of immediate desires, but in the light of their consequences for oneself and for society.

However, there are weaknesses and lapses in his philosophy, particularly in his theory of valuation. His theory strikes one as being excessively egocentric. It is true that, according to Dewey, one's desired object must be viewed also in the light of its implications for society; but this seems to be so because a man is a part of society, and what benefits society will also benefit him. There is no place in Dewey's system for anything approaching the Christian spirit of altruistic love and the *bonum honestum,* or that which is desired in itself. All emphasis is placed entirely on that which is good for me, and this on too low an empirical level. Such a system as his is entirely alien to Christian civilization, with its call to the divine love of God for Himself and of all creatures in God. It is rightly inveighed against by those who perceive its dangers, dangers which lie in the fact that such a conception of the good leads inescapably to selfishness. It is, then, a very earth-bound theory, sharing little of the clear air of the more lofty Christian ideals.

There is an incompleteness also evident in this theory, which stems from the fact that there is nothing in it by which a man might order his life. At one time, Dewey will say that one must look into the future and foresee what the more distant consequences of an action will be as well as the immediate. At another time, he will say that it is sufficient that a present evil be abolished or at least mitigated. But exactly what constitutes an evil, or the good that will supplant the evil he does not say. There is nothing given by which a man can judge whether a thing is evil or good or towards what he should order his present good. This is a serious defect in a theory of values in the

t prevents a man who lives only by it from ordering his whole life. Rather, it seems necessary that life must be lived, as it were, in parels, each independent of the other, accomplishing now this end, now hat, but without any preconceived unity or coherence, without the possibility of ordering this and that end towards any satisfactorily complete end. There is no discussion of the purpose of life or of action. Is it happiness? But what constitutes happiness? Is the constituent element of happiness pleasure? Seemingly not. But what is it? All such matters are left in nebulous obscurity. Sometimes it seems that he perfecting of the race is the ideal to be sought through constant hange and progression. But what is to be the term of the change or progression? What is the norm by which a man is to judge what *is* he "perfect man"? If progress to the better is automatic and independent of human activity, then it provides no grounds for regulating ny life within certain limits, for I can neither help nor hinder it. f it depends upon me, then I must know to what end I am to order ny life, so that it may be accomplished. And this end is not given to ne.

Again, such an incompleteness is alien to Christian philosophy. We *ave* an end that *we* must achieve for ourselves and that unifies our whole life. Moreover, it is a *personal* end, not a "generic" one. And n accord with this end, which is man's beatitude in the possession f God, all one's life can and *should* be intelligently ordered.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE *PRIMA VIA*

—*Continued*

Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

V

CAJETAN

Cajetan, writing two-and-a-half centuries after St. Thomas and in a milieu in which the Thomistic distinction between essence and existential act had long been neglected,[114] approaches the argument in the background of an Arabian controversy. Avicenna had reasoned that since no science establishes its own subject, *ens commune* and not God is the subject of metaphysics. Averroes, wishing to safeguard against this view the traditional Aristotelian conception of the science, used the same principle[115] to show that separate substance, which is indeed the subject of metaphysics, has to be established in natural philosophy.[116] The Aristotelian argument from motion, accordingly, becomes with Averroes a purely *physical* argument.

In this background Cajetan admits that the *prima via* seems to conclude directly to a movent no more immobile than an intellective soul. In support he cites what St. Thomas says in the *Contra Gentiles*.[117] The argument, therefore, is to be looked upon as concluding immediately only to a predicate which is in truth proper to God and is later shown to be such. In this way the existence of the predicate

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[114]"Et scito quod ista quaestio est subtilissima, et propria antiquis metaphysics: a modernulis autem valde aliena, quia tenent non solum in Deo, sed in omni re, essentiam identificari existentiae illius" (*In ST*, I, q. 3, a. 4, comm. I [ed. Leonine, IV, 42b]).

[115]Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphys.*, I, 1 (Venice, 1508, fol. 70a-b) and Averroes, *In I Phys.*, 83 (Venice, 1562, fol. 47va) and *In II Phys.*, 26, (fol. 59ra). In Aristotle the principle that no science establishes its own subject (*Posterior Analytics*, i. 10. 76b11-13) seems restricted to the particular sciences and does not apply to the primary philosophy. Cf. *Metaphysics*, E. 1. 1025b7-8 and St. Thomas, *In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Cathala no. 1151).

[116]Cf. Cajetan, *In ST*, I, q. 2, a. 3, comm. I (ed. Leonine, IV, 32a).

[117]*CG*, I, cap. 13 (ed. Leonine, p. 33a48-52).

involves the existence of God.[118] It is sufficient, then, that from the argument *ex parte motus* one infers that there is a first immobile movent, not caring for the moment if it be the soul of the heavens or of the world. That is a further question. In a word, the *prima via* for Cajetan reaches a predicate proper to God, but not the divine essence immediately.

In citing the *Contra Gentiles* to support this view, Cajetan takes no note of the division of the argument from motion in that work into two *viae*. The first of these *viae*, it will be remembered, constructs the argument from Aristotelian principles and contains the reasoning and the structure later used in the *Summa Theologiae*. In regard to this first *via* of the *Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas, just as in the *Summa Theologiae*, states directly of the conclusion, "and this we call God." There is no question of its being a celestial soul. In the second *via* from motion, St. Thomas follows the stages of the argument as they are found in the eighth book of the *Physics*, admits that it reaches only a celestial soul, and then follows Aristotle over into the *Metaphysics* to reach an entirely separate movent. In neither case, therefore, does St. Thomas mean that God is reached by a purely physical argument or that the proof from motion belongs to natural philosophy. And in regard to the reasoning as it stands in the *Physics*, St. Thomas is at pains to make clear that if the two Aristotelian tenets of the eternity of the world and animation of the heavens are omitted then the argument concludes directly to God.[119]

Nor is the attitude of not caring for the moment if the immobile movent is a world soul or celestial soul to be found in the text of the *Summa*. The text looks upon the reasoning as reaching an unmoved

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[118] *In ST*, I, q. 2, a. 3, comm. III (ed. Leonine, IV, 32b). The text is given in note 10 in the first part of this article (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXX [November, 1952], 35). Cajetan's interpretation, however, does not by any means represent a unanimous Thomistic tradition at the time. C. Javellus writes: "Quantum ad rationes B. Tho. Aduerte quod licet expositor teneat has rationes non efficaciter concludere expresse Deum esse, quoniam prima et secunda non deducunt nisi ad primum corpus, id est, caelum, et animam intellectiuam, et similiter aliae non concludunt, sed tantum concludunt quaedam praedicata quae pro veritate sunt propria Deo non curando quomodo vel qualiter sint tamen sequendo doctrinam Capr. I di. 3 q. 1 melius est quod sustineas has esse sufficientes . . ." (*In I ST*, 2, 3 [Lyons, 1588] p. 8b33-40). Javellus (*In Phys.* VIII, 3, [Venice, 1555, fol. 194vb-195ra] and *In Metaphys.*, XII, q. 3 [Venice, 1568, fol. 320vb-322vb) maintains that St. Thomas does not conclude to the first principle from physical motion only, but goes on to metaphysical motion, which is necessary for the demonstration.

[119] Cf. nn. 40 and 91 (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXX [November, 1952], 45 and [January, 1953] 112).

movent which all understand to be God. There is no hint of any indifference to the nature of the movent so reached. Nor does the following question of the *Summa* proceed, as Cajetan's treatment implies, to add any further *positive* determination to the nature of the immobile movent. Rather, as St. Thomas carefully points out in the introduction to that question, it proceeds in a negative way. It does not show that the immobile movent is to be further determined as the act of existing, but rather that this pure act as already established cannot be the actualization of either matter or essence.

So much for the text itself. In passing over to doctrinal criticism, the question becomes more delicate. One must be careful not to attribute to Cajetan implications of his statements which he himself would not have accepted. But this consideration does not dispense one from pointing out the consequences to which his treatment of this problem leaves an open road. Cajetan thinks that the argument reaches a predicate which can be shown to be proper to God. But, in general, an immobile movent which may apply indifferently to God and to an intellective soul is an analogous notion—or at least some type of equivocal notion in the Aristotelian sense. In its application to its different instances it will be partly the same, partly different. It is the "different" characteristic which will determine it to a particular instance. But this different element cannot be derived from the common characteristic reached by the argument. It will have to come from some further source. Suarez will later point out quite properly that the demonstration at this stage requires an entirely new process of reasoning based upon a different starting point in order that the argument reach to God.[120]

In particular, the characteristic necessary in this case stems from a different order of being. The human intellect is so constituted that it cannot completely grasp the being of anything in a single act. To know the being of any existing thing, it has first to conceive that thing according to its essence in an act of simple apprehension and then through judgment attain that thing according to its act of existing. No matter how far—even to the infinite—it extends being as grasped in the first act of apprehension, it can never reach any act of existing. A being greater than which none can be thought, when conceived by the human intellect solely on the basis of essence, does not contain any existential act whatsoever. That is a peculiarity of the human way of thinking. St. Thomas's critique of the Anselmian argument

[120] *Disp. Metaphys.*, XXIX, 1, 17 (ed. Vives, XXVI, 25-27). Cf. *ibid.*, XVIII, 7, 36 (XXV, 642a) and 52 (648a).

was given in the first article of the same question which contains the *prima via* and so forms part of the introduction to the problem of God's existence. That critique seems based precisely on this peculiarity of human intellection. Even though one is conceiving by the term "God" that than which nothing greater can be thought, one is not thereby understanding that what is signified by the term exists (*esse in rerum natura*), unless one first admits that it does exist in reality.[121] This reasoning is that one may conceive God as something than which nothing greater can be thought, extending this conception without limits.[122] One is not thereby compelled to think that God exists. The act of really existing is not included in such a concept of infinite being. Only when the act of existing accompanies it from the very start may one argue that it exists. But that, of course, is merely to beg the question.

This profound treatment of the Anselmian argument involves the whole Thomistic doctrine that the act of existing is other than the essence as directly attained in human knowledge and that the two types of cognition, essential and existential, stem from two different sources. No matter how far the type based on essence is extended, it can never of itself attain the least act of existence.

If, then, the *prima via* leads directly to the notion of pure act in general, of immobile movent that may be indifferently the Christian God, an angel, or an Aristotelian immobile movent, the argument is no longer that of St. Thomas. It would result in a notion of pure act based on the essences of things. That notion of act, it is true, can be extended to include the notion of existential act by way of analogy. In this way only is a *concept* of existence formed. As matter is to form, so essence is to existence. As that which actuates matter is form, so that to which essence is potency, when a thing is judged to exist, actuates the essence and so comes under the concept "act." That

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[121]"Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine *Deus* significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest: quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse" (*ST*, I, q. 2, a. 1 ad 2).

[122]The Anselmian argument criticized by St. Thomas is not exactly the same as the Cartesian. "That than which nothing greater can be thought" is a notion that is indefinite rather than positively infinite. Descartes (*Meditations*, ed. Ch. Adam and P. Tannery [Paris, 1897-1910], III, 48-49 and IX, 36), on the other hand, means his idea of God to be not merely a negation of the finite, but a true idea of the infinite objectively and representatively.

concept of existence is perfectly legitimate. It is in fact the only way in which the human intellect can naturally form the concept of existence, and so it is indispensable if one is even to speak about existence at all. But from such a concept the conclusion that anything does exist can never follow. Only through the act of judgment can the act of existing be grasped as such. That is the peculiarity of the human intellect. If, then, the *prima via* concludes merely to immobile movent in general, pure act equally applicable to the Aristotelian movents, it has reached only a type of entity based upon the essences of finite things. It proves thereby that such a type of entity exists, but without giving the existential act the operative function peculiar to the metaphysics of St. Thomas. The process may go on further to show by various means that this immobile movent is (or happens to be) identified with God. But can it ever reach the philosophical notion of God that is proper to the metaphysics of St. Thomas? Will it ever be able to declare the divine essence in terms of genuine existential act? In reasoning from an essential predicate to the nature of God, is it not rather leaving the way open to a philosophical conception of God in which the divine essence ultimately becomes, if not the "cause" as in Descartes,[123] at least the "sufficient reason" for the divine existence?

The root of the difficulty undoubtedly lies in the ambiguous conception of "pure act." The argument from motion, by eliminating all potency, finally reaches pure act. But if with Aristotle potency is equated with matter and act with form, the pure act reached will be form only. If, on the other hand, the form toward which motion tends is treated as part of an essence in potency to existential act, then the elimination of all potency whatsoever will result immediately in a subsistent existential act. Such a pure act cannot at any stage be looked upon as indifferently an intellectual soul or a finite separate substance or as the Christian God. It is seen at once to be identified with the "I am who am" of Exodus.

VI

SUAREZ

Suarez, approaching the question against the background of the Arabian controversy, as Cajetan did, expressly regards the Aristotelian

[123]". . . videtur non nimis improprie dici posse *sui causa*. Ubi tamen est notandum, non intelligi conservationem quae fiat per positivum ullum causae efficientis influxum, sed tantum quod Dei essentia sit talis, ut non possit non semper existere" (*Primae Responsiones*, 143; ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 16-19 and IX, 87).

argument from motion as a purely *physical* proof.[124] It cannot reach any immaterial substance, being in many ways inefficacious for this purpose. The principle that whatever is being moved is being moved by something else does not take into account virtual act. By a virtual act a thing can reduce itself to formal act. So one might say that the heavens are being moved by some innate force, just as the downward motion of the stone results from its intrinsic heaviness.[125]

Moreover, the Aristotelian argument rests upon a false principle; namely, the eternity of the world. Even the power to cause motion eternally would not be sufficient to prove that the movent was immaterial. Still less need motion that is not eternal or motion as such be caused by an immaterial movent. To ask whether the first movent has the power of moving from itself or from another is to get outside the argument from motion and get into the metaphysical argument based on efficient causality.[126]

What is the argument which Suarez is criticizing?

Certainly it is not the *prima via* of St. Thomas. Suarez sees in the sensible thing no further act over and above its essence. The analysis of act and potency in sensible motion cannot, therefore, lead to the subsistent act of *esse*.

But is it even the Aristotelian argument? Suarez indeed intends it, by express reference,[127] to be the proof of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. Yet the basic proposition of the Stagirite in this argument seems to be undermined by the introduction of "virtual act," by which something can reduce itself to act and so dispense with the necessity of being moved by something else.

What is this virtual act?

Neither here nor elsewhere does Suarez give any further explanation than by pointing to a few examples or by citing the authority of Duns Scotus.[128]

Scotus uses both the term "virtual act" and the examples cited by Suarez. It is idle, he claims, to cite the authority of Aristotle to show universally that nothing can move itself. Sensation shows that a heavy body moves itself downward; and this is in agreement with reason, since an equivocal agent can contain the action virtually and still be formally in potency to the term of that action.[129] In reply to the objec-

[124] *Disp. Metaphys.*, XXIX, 1, 2-6 (ed. Vives, XXVI, 22-23).
[125] *Ibid.*, 7 (p. 23a).
[126] *Ibid.*, 8-17 (pp. 23-26).
[127] *Ibid.*, 7 (p. 23a).
[128] *Ibid.*, XVIII, 7, 4 (ed. Vives, XXV, 632). Cf. *ibid.*, 19 ff. (635 ff).
[129] "Quia ergo vanum est Aristotelem adducere hic ad conclusionem hanc

tion that in this case the formal act could contain nothing over and above the virtual act, Scotus admits that the virtual act precisely as such is more perfect than the formal; but where that virtual act is limited, the formal act gives a grade of perfection which is less than the virtual act, but nevertheless adds something to it.[130]

The instances of this virtual act given by Scotus are (*a*) heavy bodies moving downward of themselves, (*b*) local motion of animate things, (*c*) nutrition and augmentation, (*d*) alteration, as in water becoming cold of itself, (*e*) cognition, and (*f*) intellective appetite—that is, free will. Of these, the second, third, fifth, and sixth are vital actions and were treated by Aristotle as requiring a movent in the *generans* or the environment. The first and fourth were also considered by the Stagirite and seen as requiring a per se cause in the *generans* and a per accidens cause in the *removens prohibens*.[131]

Ultimately the reasoning of Duns Scotus in this question comes back to the inductive argument from these examples. Why is virtual act compatible with potency to formal act in the same subject and in the same respect? The ultimate answer is that we see examples of the combination; therefore, there can be nothing contradictory about the combination or we could not have those instances of it.[132]

The objection that naturally arises is faced squarely. Formal act contains something more than virtual act. Therefore virtual act cannot fully account for it.

The reply of Scotus has been that the virtual act is of itself more perfect; yet in limited agents the formal adds a less perfect grade

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generaliter probandum, quod nihil movet se, cum in simplicibus motis nihil valeat, sicut in potentiis animae, cum etiam in quibuscumque quantis . . ." (*Metaphys.*, IX, 14, 16 [ed. Vives, VII, 595a]).

". . . et sensui concordat quod grave a se movetur, et secundum Aristotelem in 8. Physicorum: *Fatuum est quaerere rationem, ubi habetur sensus;* et concordat rationi . . . et movet actione aequivoca, et ipsum est capax termini illius actionis; ergo sic movebit se" (*ibid.*, 10 [589b-90a]).

Cf. also *Opus Oxon.*, I, 3, 9, 3, 27-30 (Quaracchi, I, 453-56 [no. 501]); II, 2, 10 (II, 196-208 [nos. 199-208]); II, 25, 1 (II, 687-95 [nos. 3-15]).

[130]". . . praecise sumendo utrumque actum scilicet virtualem et formalem, virtualis perfectior est; quando tamen est limitatus, non est ita perfectus, ut omnem potentiam subjecti excludat respectu formalis, quia ille formalis aliqua perfectio est, inquantum distinguitur a virtuali, et ita secundum illum proprium gradum ejus non perficeretur subjectum, quod haberet solum virtualem" (*Metaphys.*, IX, 14, 22 [ed. Vives, VII, 599b]).

[131]*Ibid.*, 10-13 (589-92). As to Aristotle, see the texts in notes 46 to 49 in the first part of this article (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXX [November, 1952], 46).

[132]". . . ex ratione actus virtualis et formalis, numquam est repugnantia quod insint eidem, quia tunc ubique esset repugnantia" (Scotus, *Metaphys.*, IX, 14, 22 [ed. Vives, VII, 599-600]).

which nevertheless is a real addition to the virtual act.

Where does this addition come from? Scotus here seems utterly unaware of any problem at all, for an equivocal agent contains the perfection of its effect in a more perfect way. He writes as though that fully accounts for all the perfection in the effect, even including the added grade.

What background of efficient causality does such reasoning imply?

In Aristotle, efficient causality was explained entirely in terms of form. All that was required to account for the new effect was equal or greater formal perfection in the source of motion. Therefore no separate (Platonic) forms were necessary to explain causality.[133] But in this reasoning of the Stagirite, no notice of any existential problem is taken. As long as the required formal perfection is found in the agent, the new effect seems to be fully explained.

The reasoning of Duns Scotus seems to be fixed in this Aristotelian background. With univocal agents, self-motion is impossible because the formal act is already present in the agent. But in equivocal agents, the act is not yet formally present, though it is virtually so. From this virtual act the agent can *reduce itself* to formal act. The perfection is already there in a more eminent way in the virtual act, and the formal act is not yet present and so can be acquired.[134] Everything that is necesary for self-motion is present.

Certainly in a background like the Aristotelian where the metaphysical explanation of new being is restricted to the realm of form or essence, such an account seems flawless. Aristotle himself required nothing more in natural things once they had been generated and the obstacle had been removed. They "energize" forthwith. For Scotus the new mode or grade is less perfect than the virtual act and so from the viewpoint of formal causality is fully accounted for.

But what has been neglected in both the Aristotelian and Scotistic accounts?

Neither the one nor the other seems to feel any need to explain the

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[133]Aristotle *Metaphysics* Z. 7-9, 1033a24 ff. Cf. nn. 47-51 (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXX [November, 1952], 46).

[134]". . . et sic agens quodcumque aequivocum est in actu respectu effectus, non formaliter habens actum similem, quia tunc non esset agens aequivocum, sed virtualiter habens, quia scilicet formaliter habet eminentiorem. Secundum quid igitur est in potentia, et secundum quid in actu? Respondeo, est in potentia secundum terminum motus, in actu secundum principium activum aequivoce respectu termini" (*Metaphys.*, IX, 14, 18 [ed. Vives, VII, 596b]).

Neglect of the Scotistic and Aristotelian background (e.g., A. Breuer, *Der Gottesbeweis bei Thomas und Suarez* [Freiburg: St. Paulusdruckerei, 1929] pp. 11-12) makes the treatment in Suarez seem very superficial.

new act of existing that actuates a formal act which before was found only virtually in its cause. Both proceed as though there were in this regard no problem that called for a metaphysical explanation. From the viewpoint of formal causality alone the equivocal agent may be capable of accounting fully for the different effect. But what accounts for the effect as existentially different? No answer is forthcoming; no treatment even is given; no problem seems to be felt.

In this doctrine of virtual act, then, Suarez through Scotus is remaining quite within the Aristotelian explanation of being through form as act. Why, then, is the result of the proof from motion so much less in Suarez than in Aristotle? Why does the proposition that "whatever is being moved is being moved by something else" lose with Suarez —apparently, at least—the universality which it had in Aristotle?

The answer to both questions lies in the doctrine of creation. For Suarez, creation in time dispenses with the eternity of motion, the basis of the Aristotelian argument for reaching immaterial entity. Viewed by Suarez with this fatal restriction, the argument naturally cannot reach an immaterial movent. Likewise the necessity of explaining the motion of natural things ultimately through another motion, that of generation, disappears once the ultimate origin of natural things is explained not through motion, but through creation. The motion of the *generans,* accordingly, need not be taken into consideration in explaining the downward motion of heavy bodies, or the action of hot water becoming cold of itself.[135] In this double background of the Aristotelian notion of form and the Christian doctrine of creation, the argument from motion leads quite correctly to nothing further than a material first movent. But the proof being criticized is not at all the *prima via* of St. Thomas.[136]

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[135]Cf. Scotus: "Si dicatur quarto, quod generans movet, quomodo effectus in actu erit sine causa in actu? Dices, dedit virtutem. Verum est, generavit, et quando generavit, fuit; nunc non est, quomodo nunc movet?" (*Metaphys.*, IX, 14, 10 [ed. Vives, VII, 589b]). Suarez: ". . . nulla causa agens particularis habet a se virtutem agendi, sed ab alio supposito, neque etiam potest per se agere sine concursu superioris causae, ut infra constabit ex his quae de Deo et prima causa dicemus" (*Disp. Metaphys.*, XVIII, 7, 52 [ed. Vives, XXV, 648a]).

For a discussion of the "actus virtualis," cf. the fifth part (chap. 20) of L. Fuetscher's *Akt und Potenz* (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1933); and for a treatment following it into a modern background, P. Descoqs, *Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932-35), I, 306-10.

These reflections may help to understand Aristotle's preoccupation (e.g., *Metaphysics* Λ. 5. 1071a15-16 and *De Generatione Animalium* i. 2. 716a16-17) with the role played by the sun and the heavens in generation.

[136]Still further removed from the *prima via* is the cosmological argument criticized by Kant (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* A603-12). This argument

VII

CONCLUSION

The *prima via* of St. Thomas, unlike the Aristotelian argument from motion, proceeds from sensible change analyzed ultimately in terms of existential act. From this different starting point the Thomistic *via* emerges into propositions of act and potency taken in a wider sense than they were by the Stagirite and so concludes immediately to a pure act in the sense of the subsistent act of existing. This conclusion is radically different from the conclusion of the Aristotelian argument, which was a plurality of finite entities.

Why, then, does St. Thomas say so serenely that it is Aristotle who is concluding to the existence of God in a context which can refer only to the Christian God?

The answer to this question lies in the way in which St. Thomas, in general, so bewilderingly attributes his own metaphysical doctrines to the Stagirite. Using the external structure and technique of the Aristotelian argument from motion, St. Thomas reads into its formulae his own metaphysical notions. Yet so skillfully does he do this that never once in all his presentations of the argument does he put on the lips of Aristotle a statement to which the Stagirite would not literally subscribe. St. Thomas says that in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* Aristotle proves by way of motion that there is a God. Aristotle would not have the least hesitation in making this statement his own, apart from the modern capitalization. He actually means his argument in the *Metaphysics* to prove that there is a god—about fifty-five of them, in fact. For Aristotle, the term "god" was applied to the separate entities and to the celestial movents. St. Thomas, using the same term, understands it to mean something quite different. Likewise, St. Thomas maintains that it is false to say that Aristotle meant the immobile movent to be only the cause of motion, and not the cause of being, to the world.[137] That, indeed, is just what Aristotle meant

has its starting point not in things in themselves, but only in phenomena which of course have much less actuality than that which emerges even from the Aristotelian analysis of sensible things. The cosmological argument is therefore from its very start an argument radically different from the *prima via* of St. Thomas. Similarly, any interpretation which starts from a "réification statique" (E. Le Roy, *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, XV [1907], 132) of the acts involved in sensible motion does not at all approach the thought of St. Thomas.

[137]"Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum, qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse, quod Deus non sit causa substantiae caeli sed solum motus ejus" (*In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 1 [Cathala no. 1164]).

Separate entity is the cause of being to all other things. Yet by "cause of being" St. Thomas is understanding efficient causality. Aristotle meant final causality. Similarly, by the term "being" the two understand something which has its source in two radically different acts. For the Stagirite the source of being is form; for St. Thomas it is the act of existence. St. Thomas allows Aristotle to talk and all the while serenely understands the formulae in his own Christian and existential sense. Never once in commenting on these arguments does he say that Aristotle taught creation or that the Stagirite's separate substance was an efficient cause. Not for a moment does he allow that the eternity of the world motion is not essential to the Aristotelian argument or that the animation of the heavens is not a step in the reasoning of the eighth book of the *Physics*. Could a man who did not realize the nature of the material he was handling continually avoid such pitfalls?

The *prima via,* accordingly, is not the Aristotelian argument from motion, even though it uses the same external structure and technique. The Aristotelian proof, starting from sensible motion analyzed in terms of act that is equated with form, leads quite properly in the *Physics* to a celestial soul and in the *Metaphysics* to a plurality of finite separate substances. Such are the immobile movents reached by the Aristotelian argument.

The *prima via,* on the other hand, starts from motion analyzed in terms of act that extends beyond form into the existential order. The only absolutely immobile movent reached on such a basis can be the subsistent act of existing, infinite and unique, *esse* without addition or possibility of addition. It is seen at once, without any "prolonging," to be identical with the "I am who am" of Exodus. St. Thomas correctly states of it without further elucidation, "And this all understand to be God." His process of reasoning in the following Quaestio is negative. It adds no further determination to the immobile movent

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"Ex quo patet quod quamvis Aristoteles poneret mundum aeternum, non tamen credidit quod Deus non sit causa essendi ipsi mundo, sed causa motus eius tantum, ut quidam dixerunt" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 3 [ed. Leonine, no. 6]).

"Non ergo existimandum est quod Plato et Aristoteles propter hoc quod posuerunt substantias materiales, seu etiam coelestia corpora semper fuisse, eis substraxerint causam essendi" (*De Substantiis Separatis,* cap. 7; ed. J. Perrier, no. 53 [*Opuscula,* I, 157]).

A glance at these texts should be sufficient to discourage any attempt at applying a "development" theory to the present problem—namely, that as St. Thomas studied the Aristotelian texts more closely and more directly, he gradually came to realize that the Stagirite's prime movent was not the Christian God.

reached by the *prima via* and seems in no sense to be a "ransom"[138] that had to be paid for using an Aristotelian argument.

But why does St. Thomas maintain that this is the "more manifest" way, so efficacious that it cannot be resisted?

There is, of course, no question here of different proofs, but rather of different "ways" of expressing one and the same proof. Likewise, there is little need of comparison with the third, fourth, and fifth *viae* of the *Summa Theologiae,* which are extremely difficult arguments. But does not the second *via,* based on efficient causality, lead much more clearly to subsistent *esse?*

St. Thomas gives no explanation of why the *prima via* is more evident. The reason, however, seems to be fairly clear. The starting point of the *secunda via* is the acquisition of *esse* by things which did not have that *esse* before and so could not be efficient causes of themselves when they did not even exist. The starting point, accordingly, is substantial change—that is, generation—which is a particular type of motion. But substantial change is not so immediately evident through sensation as the change from cold to heat or the local motion of the stick that is being moved by the hand. Substantial change had been denied by more men—for example, all the early Greek natural philosophers—than had motion in general, as for instance by Parmenides. The starting point, motion in general, with the particular instances of alteration and local motion, is much more evident than is substantial change. The argument built upon it, accordingly, is "more manifest." There is, again, no question of regarding the *prima* and *secunda* or any of the other *viae* as separate proofs. They are merely different ways of proceeding in what is fundamentally the same argument. All five *viae* proceed by finding in various ways the existential act in sensible things and then reason to the source of that act, which is subsistent *esse.* St. Thomas had no hesitation in further dividing the argument from motion into two different ways in the *Contra Gentiles* without at all adding a new proof.

The procedures of Aristotle and of St. Thomas are therefore quite clear, and the difference between them is manifest. They lead, without any flaw in their respective demonstrative processes, to two radically different conclusions. Similarly, the procedure of Suarez is evident and his conclusion is correctly drawn from his premises. Starting with sensible things in which there is no act over and above the essence and which have their origin through creation in time, the argument from

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[138]F. van Steenberghen, *Revue Philosophique de Louvain,* XLV (1947), 310

motion cannot lead even to a spiritual movent. An entirely material movent, given its virtualities originally through creation, is sufficient to account for the motion of the universe. Understood in this background, the argument from motion is entirely *physical.*

Difficult to understand, however, is the interpretation of Cajetan. Cajetan defends a real distinction between essence and *esse* yet takes no account of such a distinction in commenting on the *prima via.* He sees the argument leading only to a predicate, which is later shown to be proper to God. Yet how this can be done, in regard to a philosophical notion of God as subsistent existential act, without an unjustifiable passage from the realm of essences to the existential order is hard to understand. The only possible method seems to be simply to return to the argument and, by taking another look at it, to see that the immobile movent which one mistook for a predicate was all the time the divine *esse* itself. But in this case one is only confirming the procedure of St. Thomas in saying immediately, "And this all understand to be God." On the basis of an analysis of sensible motion as ultimately made actual by existential act,[139] the movent that is not being moved by anything, in the sense explained in the text of not being actuated by anything in imparting its motion, can be only the ultimate act which does not actuate an essence and so is the subsistent act of existing, *esse* without addition or possibility of addition. Evident at once to Christian, Jew, or Moslem is the immediate identity of this act with Him who in Exodus revealed Himself as "I am who am." Such is the immediate conclusion of the *prima via.*

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[139]"Dicimus enim non entia esse intelligibilia vel opinabilia, aut etiam concupiscibilia, sed non dicimus ea esse mota. Quia, cum moveri significet esse actu, sequeretur quod non entia actu essent actu; quod patet esse falsum" (*In IX Metaphys.*, lect. 3 [Cathala no. 1806]).

". . . verbi gratia, si dicatur, quod omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per ens actu, et ex hoc concluderetur quod Deus esset ens actu, cum per ipsum omnia in esse educantur" (*De Pot.*, VII, a. 7).

"In omni autem actione esse in actu est principaliter intentum et ultimum in generatione: nam, eo habito, quiescit agentis actio et motus patientis. Est igitur esse proprius effectus primi agentis, scilicet Dei: et omnia quae dant esse, hoc habent inquantum agunt in virtute Dei" (*CG*, III, cap. 66 [ed. Leonine, 188b5-11]). Cf. *CG*, II, cap. 6.

A doctrinal exposition of the existential nature of the conclusion is to be found in the "Third Observation" to the *prima via* in Gerard Smith, S.J., *Natural Theology* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 108-14.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF AUROBINDO

Paul Colaço, S.J.

Aurobindo, as we have seen, made the unfortunate mistake of identifying the "being-in-potency," the fundamental substratum of all change, with the pure, immutable being of God. Consequently he was forced to look upon the fact of becoming as a conscious energy of God issuing into world manifestation, the two together constituting the integral absolute. The logical consequences of such a mistake are not far to seek.

I. PANTHEISM

Let us suppose that the beings of the world are the manifestative modes of God-substance. Obviously, then, Aurobindo has correctly concluded, they could only be educed from the divine substance. This means that the divine substance has *become* those modes, for modes being accidental appearances in the substance have none of their own being but are the modifications of the self-same substance.

But can one rationally attribute *becoming* to the divine substance? Aurobindo categorically affirms it. But by a logical analysis of change or becoming Aristotle has clearly shown that every substance that becomes in whatever way, whether substantially or accidentally, is a finite, imperfect, and dependent being.

It is *finite* for the simple reason that a being that is fully being, having in itself the totality of being, cannot *become*. *Becoming* is a clear indication that the being that becomes is under a privation of a form that it seeks to possess.[1] Nothing can become that which it already is. The water that is already hot cannot *become* hot, but only

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This is the sixth article in a series of studies on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo Ghose. The first article appeared in Volume XXVIII, pp. 291-300; the second, third, and fourth, in Volume XXIX, pp. 29-41, 99-118, and 211-36; the fifth, in Volume XXX, pp. 123-40.

[1]Potency is defined by Père Wébert, O.P., as "un état du réel qui n'est pas actuel" (*Essai de Métaphysique Thomiste* [Paris, 1927], p. 31).

that water that is cold; that is to say, it is only water that suffers a real privation of heat that can become hot.

A being that becomes is *imperfect,* because it is intrinsically composed of act and potency. It is not a pure act. It has in itself a capacity, a potency to be perfected by other forms. Where there is a plenitude of perfection there can be an overflow or giving away, but not a becoming. Thus a glass that is full of water overflows, but a glass that is half full becomes full.

It is dependent, because for its fuller perfection it requires other forms and needs the activity of an external agent to give it those forms. For whatever is in potency cannot pass into act without a movement communicated to it from without.[2] To affirm that a potency becomes by itself an act is to affirm that it is simultaneously in potency and in act with regard to the same thing, which is a contradiction in terms.

Aurobindo does violence to all these fundamental principles based on evident facts of experience, by affirming that God has become the world. God cannot *become* the world without ceasing to be God. For a God that *becomes* is an incomplete, imperfect, and dependent being, a being that is in passive potency and needs to be moved into act by some other being in act; that is, he is no God at all. There are no two ways of explaining the existence of the world. Either God becomes the world—that is to say, there is no God (atheism)—or God is identical with the world (pantheism, which logically leads either to monism or acosmism); or, as Aristotle rightly concluded, the world is the effect of the act of the prime mover who moves all things without being moved.

But Aristotle apparently did not push the inquiry further. It was St. Thomas who clearly showed that that act of making the world could not be on the part of God an act *per modum naturae,* for that would imply a becoming in God, but *per modum voluntatis,* by a free will of God. Thus creation ultimately means a donation of being to nothingness. We must not conceive nothingness as a subject in which being is projected. The definition only means that God's causality in the production of the finite being is so absolute that it extends not only to the surface of the thing created but to its very substance and to everything that constitutes the substance—matter as well as form, act as well as potency; in short, each and every thing in it that is in any way being. Take away all the beingness in a created being and what remains is its own abyss or nothingness. This is what is meant by saying that God created the world *ex nihilo sui et subjecti.* There

[2]St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 2, a. 3.

is nothing in this that offends reason; rather, it is the only explanation that squares with the transcendence of God and the contingency of the world testified by reason and experience.

II. PANPSYCHISM

Consistently with his theory of universal conscious substance, Aurobindo defines person as a conscious being.[3] But by consciousness he does not mean, as the Scholastics do, "the mind's direct, intuitive, or immediate knowledge either of its own operations, or of something other than itself upon it,"[4] but simply the force of divine energy that is somehow self-aware.[5] And since all creatures down to the tiniest atom are a formulation of that force of energy, all creatures, in his opinion, possess consciousness. In fact, his belief in panpsychism is so complete that he tells us in unequivocal terms that those who identify consciousness with mental waking states are laboring "under a vulgar and shallow idea of the nature of consciousness."[6] He indeed admits that consciousness is dormant in matter, but a consciousness that is asleep is consciousness nevertheless. If we did not believe that consciousness in potency is a real consciousness, we should not attribute it to a thing at all.

But panpsychism is a gratuitous supposition. A capacity of a thing is known only by its acts; we have absolutely no other way of ascertaining whether a thing possesses a certain nature or not. If, therefore, a thing never under any condition shows real signs of consciousness—that is, awareness of the presence of objects or awareness of its own activity or of itself in activity—we are not justified in attributing consciousness to that thing. It is a wise axiom of logic that *ab esse ad posse valet illatio,* and not *a posse ad esse.*

Aurobindo quotes Sir J. C. Bose in favor of his theory. No one doubts the scientific accuracy of the facts observed by Sir J. C. Bose. But what philosophers and even scientists deny is the *interpretation* he puts on the facts. Consciousness is always an accompaniment of knowledge, sensible or intellectual. Now, the reactions of beings that enjoy either sensible knowledge (like animals) or intellectual knowl-

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[3]*The Life Divine* (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1939-40), II, Part I, 89.

[4]Michael Maher, *Psychology* (2d ed.; London: Longmans, 1893), p. 25.

[5]*Life Divine,* I, 134. One fails to understand how anything could be self-aware without an objective knowledge. As Suarez well notes, "Omnis scientia necessario esse debet de aliqua re scibili" (cf. *Opera Omnia,* Vol. I, Lib. III, n. 2).

[6]*Life Divine,* I, 128.

edge (like men) are not only in *degree* but in *kind* different from the reactions of plants to similar stimuli. From a mere similarity in external reactions, without any known sign of consciousness such as knowledge, joy, sorrow, and so on, one cannot jump to the conclusion that plants have sensation like animals; this is neither scientific nor philosophical. In a very learned article on the experiments of Sir J. C. Bose, an Italian scientist has clearly shown how all those shrinkings and collapsing of plants under electric or chemical stimuli are satisfactorily explained by the principle of tropism and reflex action.[7]

Again, Aurobindo writes:

> We see in the animal operations of a perfect purposefulness and an exact, indeed a scientifically minute knowledge. We are entitled to see in this general fact the proof of a conscious Force at work in the animal and the insect which is more intelligent, more purposeful, more aware of its intention, its ends, its means, its conditions, than the highest mentality yet manifested in any individual form on earth. And in the operations of inanimate Nature we find the same pervading characteristics of a supreme hidden intelligence.[8]

Nobody denies that in all things pertaining to its well-being and that of its species an animal acts with almost unfailing accuracy and manifests marvelous finality. But where accuracy of action of the kind we notice in animals can be explained on the basis of instinct, and their stupendous finality or purposefulness by the intention of the Creator imbedded in their nature, to interpret instinct by "scientifically minute knowledge" and finality of action by a hidden divinity is, to say the least, gratuitous. It is one thing to say that the Creator, according to His eternal intention, has given to beings below the order of man a nature with fixed laws of activity, and quite another to say that God's intelligence is the substratum of animals and plants and atoms.

Even Aurobindo himself admits in another volume of the same book in which the above passage occurs that when

> mind is awakened, there is a conscious life, a profound transition has been made. . . . Between the highest animal and the lowest animal there is a still deeper though narrower gulf to be crossed, the gulf between sense-mind and the intellect: for however we may insist on the primitive nature of the savage, we cannot alter the fact that the most primitive human being has above and beyond the sense-mind, emotional vitality and practical intelligence which we share with the animals, a human

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[7]Giuseppina Pastori, "Sensibilità e mobilità nei vegetali," *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica*, XX (1928), 229-45.

[8]*Life Divine*, I, 134-35.

> intellect and is capable—in whatever limits—of reflection, ideas, conscious invention, religious and ethical thought and feeling, everything fundamental of which man as a race is capable.[9]

One does not see how this passage agrees logically with what has preceded. For how could anything have "scientifically minute knowledge" and yet not have a faculty of ideas and reflection? It is a commonplace that only mind can abstract universal concepts and form an idea of relations which is the basis of scientific knowledge. An animal instinct is far from anything like that. It is rather a natural and uniform response to given stimuli explained by an innate habit that is part and parcel of animal nature.

Although it is difficult to say with any degree of precision and definitiveness what instinct is like in itself, we can safely say what it is not. A study of facts shows that instinct cannot in any sense be identified with intelligence and reason.[10]

St. Thomas does not hesitate to affirm that instinct is a practical estimative or judging capacity.[11] But the judgment he attributes to animals is by no means a rational judgment[12] such as is found in men. A rational judgment is arrived at after seeing the predicate as related to the subject; that is, after comparing two terms by means of a commonly related term. Such a logical process demands, first, an apprehension of two terms, one of which is universal—that is, liberated from the limiting conditions of time and space; secondly, a com-

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[9] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 633.

[10] Here are two modern distinctions based on scientific study of animal instincts. In his *Traité de Psychologie* (Paris, 1934) G. Dwelshauvers remarks: "L'intelligence se distinquit par sa souplesse, l'instinct était aveugle nécessaire et invariable" (p. 171). Elie Rabier says this: "A coup sur l'instinct est accompagné de conscience, mais il n'a pas conscience de sa fin; ce n'est pas dire que l'instinct n'ait pas de fin mais cette fin n'est pas sue de l'animal. L'instinct s'il a conscience de ce qu'il fait, n'a donc pas conscience du pourquoi de ce qu'il fait" (*Leçons de Philosophie*, Vol. I, *Psychologie* [4th ed.; Paris, 1893], p. 669).

[11] "Quaedam agunt absque judicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero, sicut animalia bruta . . . quia non ex collatione sed ex naturali instinctu hoc judicat" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 1).

[12] Fr. Siwek aptly remarks: "Iudicium naturale non est 'Liberum' seu non determinatur ab ipso iudicante (sicut in homine) sed *determinatur ei ab alio* . . . ab ipsa *natura* animalis hoc iudicium determinatur . . . *finalitate intrinseca* oritur in eo statim reactio ordinis dynamici psychici erga istud obiectum . . . quod iterum irresistibiliter *motum* proportionatum determinat" (cf. *Psychologia Metaphysica* [Rome: Univ. Gregoriana, 1944], pp. 172-73). Cf. Peter Hoenen, S.J., *La Théorie du jugement d'apres St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Rome: Univ. Gregoriana, 1946), chapter 8, for an excellent analysis of sense judgment; see especially pp. 250-51.

parison of the two terms and finding their relation of agreement or disagreement;[13] and thirdly a mental act of affirmation or denial of the agreement or disagreement discerned.[14] All this necessarily implies in the being and in its operations a degree of independence of matter[15] that is obviously not found in animals, whose sensible nature is, so to say, immersed in matter.[16]

A simple proof that the animals have no spiritual ideas is their manifest inability from the beginning of time to develop a language properly so called or a culture or civilization worthy of intelligent beings. "Animals have indeed percepts and images," writes Dr. Coffey, "but they have no *ideas* or *concepts;* they do not understand what things are; they do not interpret their sense experiences as we interpret ours and theirs, nor have they language, the medium of expressing and communicating thought."[17]

In the face of these simple and evident facts of experience, to attribute conscious activity to all things and therefore implicitly to affirm that all things are persons, is not only to caricature a human person, but, as Professor Adhar Chandra has very appropriately pointed out, to resort "to gross anthropomorphism."[18] The same author adds: "We know in our case what consciousness is. And when in the 'seekings and shrinkings' of plants, we read the working of consciousness, we are merely extending our self-knowledge to the plant-world."[19]

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[13]St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, I, art. 2; *Perihermeneias*, I, lect. 3; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 58, a. 2; *In VI Metaphysicorum*, lect. 4.

[14]"To judge, in the logical sense of the word", writes H. W. B. Joseph, "is not to acquit or condemn, but to affirm or deny a predicate of a subject" (*An Introduction to Logic* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906], p. 12). Cardinal Mercier in his *Métaphysique générale* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1910) expresses the idea thus: "La vérité ontologique est un rapport d'identité de nature entre une chose présente et un type idéal presupposé . . . nous jugeons qu'il a verité ontologique, c'est-à-dire que le realité est veritablement la même que le type auquel elle a été comparée" (p. 201).

[15]St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 1; *De Ver.*, II, art. 2.

[16]"Quod sensus visus, quia omnino materialis est nullo modo elevari potest ad aliquid immateriale . . . visus nullo modo potest in abstractione cognoscere id quod in concretione cognoscit; nullo enim modo potest percipere naturam nisi hanc [i.e., singular objects determined by time and space and shape]: sed intellectus noster potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione cognoscit" (St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I, q. 18, a. 3 and a. 4 ad 3).

[17]*Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1917), I, 3. Cf. Joseph Frobes, S.J., *Psychologia Speculativa* (Herder, 1927), I, 32.

[18]*Sri Aurobindo and the Future of Mankind* (Calcutta, 1934), p. 40.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 39. Since this book appeared Mr. Anilbaran Roy has attempted in vain to answer the charge of Mr. Das. (Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 44-45.)

And if, by an impossible supposition, all things were impregnated by some kind of conscious or purposeful energy, even that by itself would not be sufficient to constitute a real person.

> The word *person* [says St. Thomas] as it is commonly taken signifies only an individual substance of a rational nature. And because under an individual substance of rational nature is contained individual substance—that is, an incommunicable substance, whether it be of God or angel or man—it is necessary that a divine person signify a subsisting distinct being in the divine nature, just as a human person signifies a subsisting distinct being in a human nature; and this is the formal signification of a person, divine as well as human.[20]

Thus distinct individual subsistence is the first fundamental element,[21] without which there is not, properly speaking, an integral *thing*;[22] there is at best a mode of a thing; and a mode of a thing being an accidental form, it is not something to which actions could be attributed—*actiones sunt suppositorum.*

III. DETERMINISM

But this element alone would not make a thing a person. To be a person it is necessary that individual nature be a rational nature; for only a reasonable being can be a subject of rights and duties, responsible for his actions. To deny rationality as a constituent element of personality[23] is, as Father Renard remarks, "to destroy all responsibility, and to promote a system of immorality which can terminate only in the glorification of the ego and of the state."[24]

What liberty of action would there be in man in Aurobindo's theory of universal consciousness? He frankly admits that there is none.

> This is what the old wisdom meant when it said that man imagines himself to be the doer of the work by his free will,

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[20] *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 4; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 29, a. 3.

[21] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 77, a. 2.

[22] St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, cap. 21; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 2, a. 2.

[23] The English word "personality" is a misleading term. In common parlance it signifies characteristic features, physical, moral, or intellectual. We thus speak of a fine personality, dominating personality, captivating personality, and so on. But philosophically personality means none of these things; it means a rational nature with individual subsistency. Aurobindo does not make this distinction and therefore confuses one for the other. Thus he tells us in *The Life Divine*, "Personality . . . is a limitation by a restricted formation of powers, qualities, habitual forces of the nature-action . . ." (II, 88).

[24] Henri Renard, S.J., *The Philosophy of Being* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1943), p. 240.

> but in reality Nature determines all his works and even the wise are compelled to follow their own nature.[25]

And again he writes:

> He is surely a bounded soul who has never felt the brooding wings of Fate overshadow the world. . . . Fate and Free-Will are only two movements of one indivisible energy. . . . I have a will, that is plain; but it is not true that it is free in the sense of being a thing apart in the world determining itself and its actions and fruits as if it alone existed or as if it could at all shape itself except as visible crest and form of an invisible wave.[26]

Yet another passage may be cited:

> Our notion of free will is apt to be tainted with the excessive individualism of the human ego and to assume the figure of an independent will acting on its own isolated account, in a complete liberty without any determination other than its own choice and single unrelated movement. This idea ignores the fact that our natural being is a part of cosmic Nature. . . . The will of the individual, even when completely free, could not act in an isolated independence, because the individual being and nature are included in the Universal Being and Nature and dependent on the all-overruling Transcendence.[27]

If one reads these statements carefully, one cannot help detecting an implied effort to grant freedom of action to human beings. Most of Aurobindo's statements are an affirmation and a denial of freedom at the same time. We are told in one place that "man's freedom is relative"[28] and in another that everything "is determined by the compelling truth of the real idea . . . predetermined in its self-working";[29] in another place, again, we are told there is "no blind cruel and ineluctable Necessity against which the things of the soul must dash themselves in vain,"[30] and yet "the power [of the cosmic and transcendental will] to govern is complete and absolute,"[31] so that I am an "instrument"[32] working as part of the great whole.

Why all this hesitation? The answer is simple. Try as we may, we cannot succeed in silencing the voice of our conscience telling us at

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[25] *Life Divine*, I, 324.
[26] *Ibid.*, 13-14.
[27] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 964.
[28] *Ibid.*, Part I, 162.
[29] *Ibid.*, I, 201.
[30] *The Superman* (2d ed.; New York: Authors & Publishers Corp., 1922), p. 14.
[31] *Life Divine*, II, Part I, 161; Part II, 965.
[32] *The Superman*, p. 13.

every instant that the choice of action is our own.[33] The same conscience tells us also that the line of action we have actually chosen has not been determined by any force in the world, divine or human, but has been freely—that is, knowingly and willingly—determined by us.[34] And that is the reason why men, and men alone, not animals, are taken to task and punished by the state for civil transgressions and by God for all moral transgressions in thought, word, or deed.

The theory of divine universal consciousness shifts moral responsibility back to God[35] against the clear testimony of individual conscience and with open violence to the rational and religious sense in man. To make God Himself the cause of moral evil is not only blasphemously irreligious, but is the last resort of man's cowardice to escape responsibility for his own actions.

However laudable Aurobindo's effort to grant relative freedom to human beings, logically such relative freedom can have no place in his theory. There could be relative freedom only on the supposition that man is an individual subsisting being. To be free is to determine one's actions by oneself without any compelling force from within or without. God's co-operation or concurring influence is of course necessary; for He is the cause, and all secondary causes depend on Him for their very being, even as the sun's rays cannot continue to be without the sun from which they proceed. But whereas the emanating light of the sun has the sun as its material cause, God as pure perfection cannot be the material cause of the world; He cannot be the substance of creation. This will imply both imperfection and modification in God, which are incompatible with his infinitely perfect nature. Creation, therefore, if it means emanation at all, is an emanation not from the substance of God but from the free will of God, in such a way that the term of the creative act of God is a complete substance; that is, something that exists *in itself* in an incommunicable way, though not *by itself*.

This distinction is necessary. Christian philosophy does not attribute to creatures independence of God or separability from Him. What it demands is that a creature, to be a real creature, needs to be a subsisting being, a supposit (*suppositum*). Accidents are not in a strict sense creatures; they are educed from the substance; they sub-

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[33] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 3.

[34] *Ibid.*, q. 29, a. 1; I-II, q. 1, a. 1; *Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 48 and III, cap. 113.

[35] "It is only our relative consciousness, alarmed or baffled by the phenomena of evil . . . that seeks to deliver the Brahman from responsibility for itself and its working . . ." (*Life Divine*, I, 48).

sist in and by the substance; they have not independent activity; their being and activity are the being and activity of the substance.

It is because Aurobindo fails to grasp the value of this distinction that he defeats his own purpose of making the world real by denying the world subsistence. He has made God the universal substance of the world and made the world accidental modes of that infinite substance. And once he has arrived at this conclusion he is right in saying that all separate "thisness" and "thatness," "myself" and "thyself" which we predicate of things in the world are an illusion, ignorance, a wrong understanding of the mind.

IV. ANTICREATIONISM

Against theistic creation Aurobindo raises two objections: first, that it implies arbitrariness and despotism on the part of the Creator and, secondly, that he becomes the callous God of pain and evil.

There cannot be any despotism about creation in the sense we have explained above. Arbitrariness or despotism supposes the existence of things before the act of creation. One could be despotic over subjects actually existing and not over nonexisting things. But the Christian notion of *creatio ex nihilo,* as the words themselves signify, expressly denies the pre-existence of anything whatever besides God before the act of creation. Creation is defined by St. Thomas as "the production of the whole substance of a thing in the previous absence both of itself and of any other subject."[36] The words "out of nothing," so often misunderstood, merely signify the order of sequence from nonbeing to being; they do not mean that "nothing" exists in eternity as a subject out of which God makes beings.[37] Nothing as nothing cannot *pre-exist* (it would not be then nothing)[38] or follow creation (the term of a creation is always a something).

Before creation, therefore, there was only God, infinitely perfect and therefore by the very plenitude of His being needing nothing within Himself to complete his being or his perfection. There were of course the infinite possibilities of finite manifestations *ad extra.* But these possibles had no actual reality of their own.

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[36]*Summa Theol.,* I, q. 65, a. 3.

[37]"It is literally making out of nothing, where 'nothing' is not some kind of Urgrund or formless prime matter co-eternal with God but the entire nonexistence of anything. . . . Creation is the calling into existence of the being itself not merely the imposition of new qualities upon it" (Eric L. Mascall, *He Who Is* [Longmans, 1943], pp. 97-98).

[38]A.-D. Sertillanges, *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy,* tr. by Godfrey Anstruther, O.P. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1931), pp. 93-131.

This does not mean that possibles are unintelligible. They are certainly not unintelligible if we understand them as having ideal reality in God, though in the order of actuality they are mere nothings. A possible by definition is that which could be but is not. Hence by no stretch of imagination can we conceive a possible that is at the same time actual. But the possibles are not unintelligible *as possibles*. Only an impossible is by itself unintelligible. But a possible by the very fact it is possible implies that there is nothing contradictory in its connotation. Hence God in knowing His essence cannot help knowing by that very identical act all and each of the possible imitabilities of His infinite perfection.[39]

But that ideal *esse* or reality which they receive in the mind of God does not invest them with any existential reality distinct from that of God. In God there is no distinction between thinking and willing and being.[40] He is a pure act without any trace of potency. To affirm, therefore, that just as ideas have an accidental being in us, so also when God knows the possibles, the possibles obtain some manner of modal existence in God, is to forget the fundamental fact that intellect in God is not a faculty as it is in us; it is identical with God's essence and therefore can acquire no modal addition or subtraction. He is ever and always a pure act.

Aurobindo has gone wrong on this point. In our exposition we have shown the mental agony he has been in to express his idea of the possibilities in God. It must be admitted that he has tried to water down their reality to almost nothing. He has told us that "they are too much one there to be differentiated," that they are in God "in their essentiality," interfused "in each other," that they do not constitute in God "a sum or concourse,"[41] and so forth.

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[39]"Deus unico et simplicissimo actu, intueri se, et in se creaturas . . . unico simplicissimo (ut Dionysius dixit) videndo suam essentiam videt omnes essentias participabiles ab illa et videndo suam necessitatem, videt possibilitatem aliorum entium" (Suarez, *Opera Omnia*, Vol. I, Lib. II, cap. ii, n. 13).

[40]"Being Itself in its pure actuality, is a perfect unity and this unity excludes by definition all such internal division as would permit the opposition of divine attribute to another, or allow of any causal action whatever of one upon another. Doubtless from the standpoint of our discursive apprehension . . . we are constrained to say that God's understanding acts upon His will, but the intellect of God is God just as the will of God is God" (Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, tr. by A. H. C. Downes [London: Sheed & Ward, 1936], p. 92).

[41]All these quotations and those in the next paragraph have been cited before in "The Absolute of Experience in the Philosophy of Aurobindo," The Modern Schoolman, xxix (January, 1952), 99-118.

But he does not admit that they are mere nothings in the order of being; that is, completely identified in the essence of God. No; he has told us that the one and the many are eternally "two poles, two sides, obverse and reverse aspects of the Absolute Being," which refuse to "co-mingle," but "co-exist" as "simultaneous reality."

This position is logically untenable. Either God is one or He is many; He cannot be both one and many without ceasing to be God. If God is one, then there is no room for any "co-existence of forms" or "simultaneity of aspects"; these in their very notion imply duality. If God is many, then He is a collection of beings. You may use "subtle," "ineffable," "essential," and a host of other grandiose terms to express their unity, but a collection He remains nevertheless[42] —and a collective God is no God at all.

Aurobindo sees this inconvenience all too well. Hence, to escape this glaring contradiction, he makes the one God eternally become the many. But he has avoided one error to fall into another. He has saved his God from being a collective God by making Him a composite God. For every *becoming*, as we have shown above, is a necessary composition of an act and a potency. And a composite God intrinsically laboring under limitation, imperfection, and dependency—qualities unavoidably proper to composite beings—fares no better, if not worse, before the bar of reason and common sense.[43]

It is because Aurobindo did not rightly understand the nature of possibles in God that he could speak of the despotism of theistic creation. But if possibles in God are understood as we have explained them—mere intelligible terms in the mind of God with no actuality of any kind, mere nothings in the order of existence—then one clearly sees in the act of creation not a despotism but an ineffable goodness.[44]

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[42]Professor Malkani takes good care to stress this weak point in Aurobindo's philosophy in his trenchant criticism of it. This is what he remarks: "We can understand in a way that there are infinite possibilities present to Him to create a world. But how can those possibilities form part of His Being? . . . If the multiplicity is already present in Sachchidananda in the form of the seed, it cannot be without reality and actuality there. We are simply transporting the world into Sachchidananda without really creating it. . . . Nothing new is created or brought forth which did not exist before. There is no real putting forth or creation" (*Philosophical Quarterly* [Sind], January, 1943, p. 254).

[43]"Le panthéiste, pour être consequent, doit sacrifier de deux choses l'une: ou bien que Dieu soit Acte pur, ou bien la réalité de la puissance dans le monde" (A. Gregoire, S.J., *Immanence et Transcendance* [Paris, 1939], p. 218).

[44]"The glory of God does not consist in receiving something from us which will make Him richer! It consists rather in giving us the means of being

For a God who is self-contained and perfect to give Himself to mere nothings that are possibles in order that they might share in His being and be actually "somethings"—that, if anything at all, is superb selflessness and generosity worthy of our love and appreciation.

Granting even that *creatio ex nihilo* implies arbitrariness, is Aurobindo's God less despotic? Let us quote again Professor Malkani's excellent criticism:

> Granting that there are infinite possibilities in Sachchidananda, what dictates the choice and the limitation? Maya is no answer. For the selection is in the end arbitrary. There is no rule about it, and there is no necessity. Any other selection might have done as well. It is certainly not the case that the truth has only one possibility of actualisation,—that which we find in the cosmos as it is.[45]

Aurobindo's answer to this is that possibles already exist in God and are only *manifested* by Him by a free choice. To this Professor Malkani comes back upon the charge as follows:

> What do we mean by manifestation? We can only mean "making appear". The question will naturally arise, making appear to whom? It cannot be to God. For nothing can be hidden from His self-union. And there is nothing beside God prior to creation to whom the world may be made manifest. . . . The terms "subtle" are relative to the capacity of an onlooker. . . . The important question in any case would be, is there anything in the gross which is absent from the subtle? . . . If there is nothing new of this sort, then the creative act has accomplished nothing. But if there is something new, then it was not contained in the seed or in the condition of subtlety, and to that extent it is a creation out of nothing,—a view not accepted by Sri Aurobindo.[46]

Aurobindo's next contention is that if we admit theistic creation there is no solution to the problem of evil. It is surprising that such an objection should come from one who identifies the substance of God with the substance of creatures. If there is one thing that pantheists find difficult to explain, it is the fact of the moral responsibility of man. They cannot logically make God and man one and yet exonerate God from the stain of moral depravity so clearly perceived in the lives of so many men.[47]

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no longer nothing" (Pierre Charles, S.J., *Prayer for All Times*, Second Series, tr. by Maud Monahan [London: Sands & Co., 1928], p. 60).

[45] *Philosophical Quarterly* (Sind), January, 1943, pp. 254-55.

[46] *Ibid.* Cf. P. Valensin, *A Travers la Métaphysique*, Livre II, *Le Panthéisme* (Paris, 1925).

[47] See Malkani, *Philosophical Quarterly* (Sind), January, 1943, p. 258.

Aurobindo will say that he is not a pantheist, that his God is a transcendent God. But there are various shades of pantheism. In general, whoever identifies the substance of God with the substance of the world, deserves the name of pantheist; for where there is no real distinction between the substance of God and the substance of the creatures, there is identity; and since all actions are of the suppositum (individual substance incommunicably existing in itself), in a theory where God and creatures have one common suppositum, there is real pantheism, and God cannot shirk the responsibility for moral evil. It is rather in the theistic creation where individual subsistency is attributed to creatures—therefore, also, individual activity—that sin and moral depravity are placed at the right door, the free and perverse choice of men.[48]

As for physical evil like pain and suffering, it must be remembered that it is to a large extent a necessary consequence of the finitude of creatures. Every finite thing is by definition not perfect in itself; it needs the co-operation and aid of others for its perfection. Hence where there are many finite things ordered into a universe, there must necessarily also be a certain amount of giving and taking, a certain amount of self-sacrificing and self-effacement for the sake of the universal prosperity.[49] As Father Sertillanges has well put it:

> There would be no such thing as action if there were no contraries, for contraries are the basis of all interchanges: the very weakness of certain things, whether beings or phenomena, is sacrificed for the birth or success of others . . . there is no life for the lion without death for the sheep, no martyr's patience without the malice of his persecutors . . . the good done more than compensates for the evil. The good resulting from a well-built house is greater than the trouble it is to build it well. Evil is evil, but it is good for evil to be. This is true at the first foundation of things and at their ultimate effects.[50]

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[48]"Être responsable, être par rapport à quelque acte, sujet réel d'imputation, c'est avoir été le principe indépendent de cet acte, en avoir été la cause par soi. Mais, pour être causé par soi, il faut avoir une existence à soi; car il ne saurait y avoir quelque indépendance a agir, où il n'y a nulle indépendance dans l'être" (Valensin, *A Travers la Métaphysique*).

[49]"Cette unité ne va pas sans la subordination des fins particuliéres. Certains êtres pourront être sacrifiés: C'est la conséquence de l'ordre de l'univers, qui est un bien supérieur au bien particulier de chacun, et qui comme tel est voulu per le Créateur. Le mal physique est donc voulu indirectement par Dieu, et il n'y a rien là qui soit contraire à sa bonté et à sa puissance. Vouloir que tout le mal soit absent du monde, c'est pratiquement exiger un miracle de tous les instants" (Gregoire, *Immanence et Transcendance*, p. 203).

[50]*Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy*, p. 128.

Small minds exaggerate physical evil to such an extent as to forget he far greater good that outweighs the evil. Aurobindo shows breadth of vision when he remarks:

> This world appears to us rather as a world of suffering than as a world of the delight of existence. Certainly, that view of the world is an exaggeration, an error of perspective. If we regard it dispassionately and with a sole view to accurate and unemotional appreciation, we shall find that the sum of the pleasures of existence far exceeds the sum of the pain of existence—appearances and individual cases to the contrary notwithstanding—and that the pleasure of existence is the normal state of nature, pain a contrary occurrence temporarily suspending and overlying the normal state.[51]

If this is true, there is no philosophical repugnance in the existence of evil in the world. One can even say without injury to the sanctity and goodness of God that in willing to create finite creatures He indirectly wills physical evil, just as a sculptor wills the sawing of the wood and the chiseling of it in willing to produce a beautiful statue which gives a hundred times more value to the wood than it had before as a rough block of wood. And indirectly, too, He permits the moral evil inasmuch as he creates rational natures endowed with the capacity to choose freely for themselves between right and wrong.

The power to choose evil is by no means "a mental disease or ignorance"[52] as Aurobindo calls it. A mentally diseased man has no freedom of choice except in lucid moments when he acts as a man rather than as a diseased man. For the rest, he is led by instinct and not by reason; that is why he is considered dangerous to society and kept in an asylum. But a man who sins, sins deliberately and with full knowledge. Otherwise there is no sin; for an act of man to be sinful, it must be a human act; that is, done with advertence and consent.

And even if all that Aurobindo has said against the theistic solution of the problem of evil were true, is his solution any better? He has told us that pain, evil, suffering—even moral evil[53]—are all a game of God,[54] a *lila,* and that for the progress of this game of self-manifestation evil and suffering are a necessity[55] and that the right attitude for us to take is to acquiesce in it and let God have His way in us.[56]

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[51] *Life Divine,* I, 140.
[52] *Ibid.,* 142.
[53] *Ibid.,* 146-47.
[54] *Ibid.,* 168.
[55] *Ibid.,* 167.
[56] *Ibid.,* II, Part I, 169-70.

Is this a solution that meets the requirements of reason and religious sense? It is true the divine *lila* he speaks of is not just childish sport for the sake of whiling away time, even though the metaphor he uses of a boy in pursuit of a girl may suggest it. *Lila* in its exalted sense means that God "without any reference to an extrinsic end, in virtue of his sole nature (*svabhava*) exercises his activity, in the form of joy."[57]

Granting that creation is a joyous sport of the divine artist "producing, conserving and reabsorbing the world,"[58] so long as creatures are nothing in themselves but internal modes of the divine being, there can be no real sport, no real outpouring of joy and goodness. One does not sport with oneself or one's own accidental modes; there should be at least two distinct beings to make a game. But in Aurobindo's theory and, as a matter of fact, in the Vedantic concept of God, there are no distinct beings. Aurobindo clearly tells us that "Brahman is the self in each individual,"[59] "our action is not ours,"[60] "our self-existence is one with his self-existence."[61]

If, therefore, our action is not our action, if our existence is identical with God's existence, how can God escape the guilt of our criminal thoughts and words and deeds? It is revolting by all standards to think that because God feels in Himself the urge for sport he could make himself responsible for the moral evil which is directly against the inviolable sanctity of God.

No, it is not by throwing a pinch of romance in God, by making Him run after nature as a boy after a girl[62] that the problem of evil is solved. It is only when *creatio ex nihilo* and the freedom of man are admitted that evil will find a satisfactory solution both on the physical and moral plane. It is only in a system of philosophy in which God is a creator who by his omnipotent will, which is also a benevolent will, causes things to be and gives each its nature and goal, in which man enjoys the gift of liberty and perfect freedom of action, that all responsibility is taken away from God for the evil done by man. Evil no doubt is bound up with the condition of human nature, but, as Father D'Arcy has well put it,

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[57]Olivier Lacombe, *L'absolu selon le Vedanta* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1937) p. 49.

[58]Sankara Bhashya, II. 1. 33.

[59]*Life Divine*, II, Part I, 173.

[60]*Ibid.*, 45.

[61]*Essays on the Gita*, Second Series (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1937) p. 77.

[62]*Thoughts and Glimpses* (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1941), p. 13.

physical trial and suffering which at first sight are such a disfigurement of life comes out in the end to be the necessary accompaniment of our virtue and the stimulus to perfection. Its worst manifestations are passing and can be made to serve our highest purposes, and where at present it may seem to fail and to frustrate good we have the right to wait on the future and have faith in a plan which stretches over thousands of years and has not yet reached its end. And as for moral evil we have only ourselves to blame. Our virtue springs from freedom and comes to its strength by trial and effort. A make-believe trial could never succeed in generating virtues we love most and a real trial means real risks and failure. In sighing, therefore, for a halcyon world and release from the strain of our days we are really asking for a museum and not a world, a museum in which we would like desiccated mummies be sans strength and sans happiness.[63]

[63]Martin C. D'Arcy, S.J., *Pain and the Providence of God* (London, 1935), pp. 13-14.

CHRONICLE

A Symposium entitled "The Relations between Science and Thomistic Philosophy" was given before Section L of the American Association for the Advancement of Science on December 28, 1952. Papers were given by the Reverend Robert J. Henle, S.J., and George P. Klubertanz, S.J., of Saint Louis University, Professor Yves Simon, of the University of Chicago, and Professor Hugh S. Taylor, of Princeton University.

The Southwestern Philosophical Conference held its annual meeting at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, December 21-23, 1952. On Monday, December 22, the morning session heard papers by A. Bahm, "Nine Types of Logic"; G. Mueller, "On Truth"; I. McGreal, "Truth and Philosophic Data"; and P. Carmichael, "Instantiation." At the afternoon session, the following papers were read: J. S. Fulton, "Purpose and Negative Feedback"; C. Berenda, "The Procrustean Bed of Science"; H. Lee, "A Semantic Criticism of Reichenbach's Ethics"; and E. Ballard, "In Defense of Symbolic Aesthetics." The presidential address, by E. S. Robinson, was given at the banquet that evening. On December 23, these papers were read: V. Cauchy, "Faith and Philosophical Autonomy"; J. C. Feaver, "The Idea of Community in Edwards and Royce"; R. Whittemore, "The Double Mistake of Traditional Deism"; and R. Tsanoff, "The Relations of Laws to Morals."

An Alumni Philosophy Club has been organized at St. Peter's College, Jersey City, under the direction of Reverend Matthew Rooney, S.J. Members meet every three weeks.

The Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Montreal announces the inauguration of a summer session, which will run from June 17 to August 9, 1953. Instruction will be provided on both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Seminars on Roger Bacon and the Arab and Jewish sources of Scholasticism will be offered for graduate credit.

Dr. Andrew G. O'Connor and Dr. John J. Pauson, assistant professors in the newly founded English section of the Faculty of Philosophy, will deliver the lectures and conduct the seminars.

The Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Madrid has set up a special course for non-Spanish students. Students who wish to take the doctorate must have a master's degree or its equivalent. These courses, however, are also open to students who do not wish to obtain academic credit.

BOOK REVIEWS

Actus del Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía. 3 vols. Cuyo: Universidad Nacional, 1951. Pp. 2197.

Three quarto volumes—2197 pages full of philosophical thought—are the material result of the first National Congress of Philosophy held in Mendoza, Argentina, from March 30 to April 9, 1949. Its importance and transcendence in the wide field of culture are even greater. It is a sign of the cultural maturity of Argentine thinkers and a promise of a fuller sharing of the Latin American countries in the maintenance and development of Occidental thought.

As was declared by the president of the congress, F. Cruz, rector of the National University of Cuyo, this meeting constituted a fundamental step indispensable for the realization of Argentine national culture. Besides, it was a significant event because such an intense interest in philosophy has been shown only in healthy times and by vigorous peoples.

A well-defined philosophical movement in Argentina, according to Vice-President Coriolano Alberini, really started about 1910, thanks to a group of enthusiastic young members of the faculty of Buenos Aires University. They were at first much ridiculed and despised, and many times an effort was made to suppress this faculty of philosophy. But in the long run the constancy of the young philosophers—among them the now respected Dr. Coriolano Alberini—resulted in success. So this recent congress, the very idea of which would have been laughable forty years ago, became a promising reality.

Th idea of the congress, which originated in the University of Cuyo —the youngest of Argentine universities—was eventually given government sponsorship and hence took on a national character. Further, the two hundred and fifty papers presented by outstanding philosophers of most of the countries outside the Iron Curtain made this event decidedly international.

The ten plenary sessions, the thirteen special meetings, in addition to the inaugural and final meetings, provided ample occupation for the delegates throughout the ten days of the congress. In addition to the intellectual interest of the congress were the several banquets, receptions, and outings that were given for the delegates. All the foreign

members seemed delighted with the charming and generous hospitality given to them by Argentina.

Inasmuch as it is impossible to give a full appreciation of the talks presented at the congress, no more than a glimpse of them will be given.

At the inaugural session, the National University of Brazil, through its delegate, Dr. A. Carneiro Leão, told the congress that the greatest tragedy of the present hour lies in the lack of harmony between the spiritual and the material. Therefore, he argued, any adjustment that can be made to diminish the distance between these realities is a work of salvation.

At the second plenary session of the congress, Dr. Donald Brinkmann, of the University of Zürich, spoke with originality on "Man and Technique." Notwithstanding the seeming antagonism between philosophy and technique, he said, there is a fundamental identity in them. In both we find a common tendency to universality. The philosophers are not content with the notion of man as "Homo sapiens" only. The *praxis humana*—the full variety and even contrariety of human conduct—must be considered also. Technique, on the other hand, not only claims, but in fact for the past few generations has exercised, its domain over the realm of the *Dasein* ever more widely. Technique both in war and in peace compenetrates the human and extrahuman reality to an extent and depth that one can hardly measure. The deepest impulse of the technique does not come from its being an applied natural science—which it is not—or from its economical purport, but from the craving of man for his self-salvation. It is but a corollary of the Renaissance.

The third plenary session was wholly dedicated to existentialism. Of the many papers presented, that of Nicola Albagnano, of the Universita degli Studi di Torino, was particularly enlightening. Existentialism, according to Dr. Albagnano, can be compared with illuminism. This found a rationalism contented and satisfied, denying any problems for reason, and put the very reason as a problem. Kant brought this movement to an apex. Existentialism finds human reason in the precarious state to which it has been reduced by an instrumentalistic pragmatism which says that the only issue of man is to find a way, an instrument, to adapt himself to the exterior world, since he is unable to find a firm support in any transcendent truth. Thus existentialism concentrates the problem on man himself. He has no certitude, only the possibility of life or death. Anything can be; anything is possible. The solution should not be a

cowardly and inoperating pessimism, but rather an effort to find a truth to which to anchor himself.

By way of conclusion there should be mentioned the third of the eight final propositions unanimously approved by the congress. This affirms that "besides the corporal [body] which explains [man's] rooting into the world, it is necessary [to admit] the spirit which explains his transcendent destiny, the Supreme Being, to which he must arrive through his free action."

This proposition summarizes the general trend of thought which prevailed at the congress: a reaffirmation of the realities and values of the spirit and a renewed faith in metaphysical truths.

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Jean Paul Sartre, Darstellung und Kritik seiner Philosophie. By Hans Heinz Holz. Meisenheim am Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1951. Pp. 139.

Hans Heinz Holz deals with Sartre's philosophy in the orthodox manner of seeking out its sources, its basic principles, being as related to things and consciousness, being and void, the concept of transcendence, the problem of engagement, of "the other," psychoanalysis, freedom, truth, and history. But it cannot be said that this is just another book on Sartre, because the author delves deeply into his subject and comes up with many observations that are new and that, on the basis of the evidence, seem to be quite tenable. For instance, he sees in the Sartrian *pour-soi*, "being-for-itself," a pure methodical transcendental which has ontological consequences; namely, a movement towards extreme German idealism as represented by Fichte. For both Fichte and Sartre faced the central difficulty of how the ego could have itself for an object: "Die erste Frage wäre sonach die: Wie ist das Ich für sich selbst?" The answer to this question is, for Hans Holz, the *point de départ* for all the theories on the philosophy of existence. For the construction of the concept of the world which is derived from this starting point eventually leads to the subjective-idealistic theses that are the bases for all philosophies of existence.

Holz exposes the parallel between Bergson finding his way to the "creative freedom" of men by going back over his experience of "duration" (Dauer) and Husserl subjectively solving the problem of the "other," the object, by going back over the workings of the inner consciousness of time. He shows how Husserl extended Brentano's concept of "evidence" as the criterion of knowledge to arrive at the transcendental ego. Finally, he develops Sartre's explanation

of Husserl's transcendental ego as an inadequate explanation of the true character of consciousness. After exploring the origins of Sartre's philosophy, the author then traces out the method of Sartre's phenomenology as it is founded on Heidegger's dictum that "ontology is only possible as a phenomenology."

The definition of man is founded on the concept of the void (*das Nichts*), and the concept of transcendence is derived from the *pour-soi*, what Heidegger calls the "ec-static structure" of man. This leaves man always confronted by the fact that he is never solely unto himself (*bei sich*) but always and irrevocably in the midst of things (*bei den Dingen*). Things bind man in, limit him, are always present to him. Jaspers' *Grenzsituation*, "limiting situation," brings up the problem of "engagement" which again lays the ground for existentialism's ethos of action. Man is constantly thrown back upon his intolerable limitation, and he must create himself by free action. Thus "engagement" emerges as the force for decisive determination which is the only possible form of the *pour-soi*'s activity in and upon the world (*Weltzugewandtheit*).

Existential psychoanalysis *à la Sartre* makes complete use of the concepts and especially the erotic symbols of Freud. Its therapy, however, has been given something of a new twist that seemed to be postulated by its philosophical fundament. In this case, it is the function of psychoanalysis to release man from the tensions and neuroses evoked in him by *mauvaise foi*; that is, his efforts to escape a face-to-face encounter with the anguish, the futility of his destiny for nothingness by means of such fictions as faith, religious belief in God, belief in the supernatural and the transcendent, and so on. Consequently, the whole drive of existential psychoanalysis moves toward "engagement," total engagement in life. Face the nothingness, the void, "with your eyes wide open," as it were, and the tensions and neuroses created by a belief in transcendentals, in absolutes, will disappear.

The last twenty-nine pages of the book develop a tightly interlocked critique based on a comparison between Heidegger and Sartre, the interiority of the existential problem, its essential subjectivity, and the clash between the brooding of the romantic spirit and the classic atheistic rationalism of the Enlightenment. Finally, a short appendix on the literary expressions of existentialism (an attitude towards life lends itself to an infinite variety of developments, much more so than a systematized body of rational principles) concludes the volume.

Certainly, Hans Heinz Holz's analysis of Sartre demands patient study and considerable philosophical background. But for those who

submit themselves to the interlocking intricacies of his thought, the prize will be well worth the effort to gain it.

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La Phénoménologie. By Francis Jeanson. Paris: Téqui, 1951. Pp. 126.

Francis Jeanson has already distinguished himself in the field of existential and phenomenological studies with an acute essay on the moral problem in Jean-Paul Sartre's thought. The present book is a brief, popular exposition of phenomenology. At the outset, the author warns that his approach is not going to be the objective one of summarizing the common features found in the various exponents of phenomenology. He does devote a few pages of the Appendix to a rapid sketch of the conceptions of phenomenology proposed by Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. But in every case the purpose of this historical review is solely to criticize these versions in the light of the one accepted by Jeanson as the only authentic phenomenology. His standard is provided by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Hence the only type of phenomenology outlined here is that of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the position of the former being decisive in cases of difference.

Drawing upon Sartre's earlier psychological studies, Jeanson first establishes the point of conflict between ordinary empirical psychology and phenomenology. Psychologists are deceiving themselves in attempting to treat their discipline as just another natural science, just one more part of physics. For the object of study is precisely the inquiring human subject himself, whose attitudes are being placed in question. However paradoxical William James's explanation of anger in physiological terms, it failed to grasp the distinctive aspect of the phenomenon—the meaning of being angry. The phenomenologist concentrates upon the meanings produced by the human subject. Does this interest in subjectively produced meanings doom him to subjectivism? This is the crucial question raised by the present essay. The author gives a negative reply, relying in part upon Husserl's analysis of intentionality or the direction of mental attitudes toward something other, toward the world. Moreover, he appeals to Sartre's statement that phenomenology is impelled by its inherent tendency to fulfill itself in an ontology. But by an ontology is meant a general study of the relations between consciousness and being. Following Sartre, Jeanson defines consciousness as an essential lack of being, which constantly projects its meanings into the world and yet never

achieves union with being. This conception of a *phenomenological* ontology succeeds in relating our meanings *to* being, but does not assure that they are significant *of* the structure of being in anything more than a constructive idealistic sense.

This conclusion is confirmed by Jeanson's reiterated subordination of speculative truth to practical intent. He regards phenomenology as being specified primarily by an ethical intention. The relation of consciousness to the world (in which ontology is chiefly interested) is basically a practical bond between a free agent and the field or situation of its active projects. Whereas Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the control exercised by the situation upon one's projects, Jeanson sides with Sartre in stressing the sovereign freedom of consciousness to choose its own attitudes and meanings. Toward the end of his essay, the author points out that phenomenology is not concerned exclusively with the individual but also embraces the social aspect of human existence, since this aspect belongs to the total situation of meaningful praxis. This leads him also to extend a hand of welcome to Marxian humanism, declaring that the relation between Marxism and phenomenology is a complementary one. The former standpoint specifies the real conditions of application of our plans, whereas phenomenology discloses their inherent meaning. Phenomenology would like to remove the determinism from the Marxian historical outlook, however, in view of the fact that not even the proletariat can achieve its mission until it freely accepts the meaning of its situation as an oppressed and nonexploiting class. Jeanson concludes that social phenomena are not determined beforehand but acquire significance in virtue of human choice. Social truth is itself a consequence of social choice. This conclusion may provide an answer to materialistic determinism in the practical order. Yet it cannot be generalized to settle the relation between truth and free choice in respect to the content of ontology, unless the latter discipline is a practical one. Jeanson's ontology is a practical science only because it is a subordinate extension of his phenomenology. No criticism of Sartrean phenomenology is presented in this book. Perhaps the best place to begin would be with Sartre's notion of the relations between metaphysics, ontology, and phenomenology.

JAMES COLLINS

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PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. By Yves R. Simon. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 324. $3.50.

"Whatever the political regime may be, monarchical, aristocratic or democratic, democratic philosophy appears as the only true political philosophy."—Jacques Maritain. *Man and the State* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 129.

Simon's book deals with the most pertinent problem of politics, the relations between freedom and authority and their co-ordination and safeguard in their highest possible perfection. The discussion covers the origin and purpose of majority rule and self-government, which aim at the realization of "the political idea by placing the governing personnel under the control of the governed" (p. 99). The author offers a stimulating, well-written, and solidly founded apologia of the most highly organized and most nearly perfect fabric of the *respublica.* Its adequate appraisal is not in the first place a matter of forms or regimes (comparative government), but of basic political philosophy.

In this reviewer's opinion Simon's *Philosophy of Democratic Government* makes for excellent reading in any advanced course on Christian principles in government. As a text it could profitably be implemented by the use of Maritain's small volume, *The Rights of Man and Natural Law* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1949). Thus the student will get a very substantial help for a thoroughgoing understanding of democracy as "a rational organization of freedoms founded upon law" (Maritain, *Man and the State*). This latter very suggestive work may, in my opinion, likewise prove to be useful as a basis for discussion in graduate classes, where its sometimes challenging terminology may be confronted with Simon's more familiar-sounding ways of expression. A. D. Lindsay's *Modern Democratic State* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947), giving more accent to the historic development of political thought, may, for different reasons, serve as a useful pendant to the fundamentals offered by the distinguished political scientists of French extraction. The student interested in the German version of the same unchanging ideas may be strongly recommended to consult for reference Johannes Messner's *Social Ethics,* (English translation of *Das Naturrecht,* [Innsbruck, 1949]). The main concern of this well-known Austrian Catholic scholar (now teaching at Vienna, Birmingham, and Muenster), similar to that of Simon and Maritain, was to examine and clarify the essentials of political philosophy based on natural law. There are certainly different shades in an English, American, French, or Central European over-all picture and a different application of the same principles in different regimes; but the postulates are of course exact-

ly the same, having originated in the same fundamental thinking and being expressed in the same political creed, which is the belief in man, his common nature, and his being directed and destined for the same end as a creature of God.

An attempt to defend the concept of democracy—challenged because of inefficiency, instability, and insincerity—with the mere pragmatic argument was unconvincing, as J. G. Kerwin says in his foreword. Articulate differentiation between political and socio-economic democracy contributed a good deal to obliterate the decisive issue.

It was indeed of little use to build walls of defense upon historic arguments and to operate with re-evaluated liberal idealisms, brought up to date with the patchwork of some social legislation. All these efforts, interested mainly in institutional formalities which vary considerably according to different national needs and traditions, proved to be hopelessly inadequate when what they erroneously believed to be democracy stood on trial.

Simon puts democracy as the solid foundation of modern political life on rational principles, deeply rooted in human nature. Its basic meaning becomes thereby a matter of philosophy of life, not of political expediency. Against this background the author discusses the function and purpose of government; he stresses the moral and necessary functions of efficient authority and proceeds to point out the *de jure* and *de facto* compatibility of coercion as cause of indispensable united action, directed towards the common good. Its nearest possible approach requires democratic freedom and equality; both are dependent on a correct concept and exact evaluation of popular sovereignty.

Here Simon, just like Maritain, Lindsay, and Messner, conceives of democracy not as the modern product of the enlightened, secularized human mind, but rather as the highest achievement of political maturity whose elements, inherent in human nature, contributed to an organic concept that is certainly older than the modern state.

Who would deny that there is an obvious and impassable gulf between Rousseauvian optimistic visions, whose glittering brilliance we may admire, and the requirements of a working democracy that we badly need? Who is nearer to political reality as it represents itself to modern man—as far as principles and institutions, too, are concerned—St. Thomas Aquinas and Suarez or Rousseau and Hegel?

Of course the divine-right and designation-theories are not forgotten. They are to be explained historically and should rightly be considered as deviations such as occur in periods of transition, but certainly not, in the first place, as logical implications of an originally

Christian political philosophy.

It is the merit of Simon's book that it stresses the ontological character of democracy as an organized protection of human rights which refers to the very nature of man, being alike in its immanent trends and impulses for all human beings. Its teleological aspect points to political society which enables man to associate and participate in government on behalf of the common good.

The main present concern should be to uphold the banner of personal freedom in our era of technology and centralized technical power (see chap. 5, pp. 260 ff.). "Technological society, by producing mass phenomena of individualistic loneliness, calls into being the totalitarian state and ends the era of democracy" (p. 309). Modern society has enormously contributed to the weakening of family life "as the foremost element of social integration. . . . Men deprived of community-life are material for government by the leaders of the mob" (p. 316). On the other hand,

> we are witnessing the incarnation of an old Christian idea, that of the universal republic under God, *respublica sub Deo*. This idea is now descending into a body of moral sentiments and natural emotions. . . . It is technology which has made it possible and easy, though painful, for the ordinary man to have a moral conscience equal to mankind. . . . In a technological world the common man can develop community feelings equal to the dimensions of the human community (p. 318).

We might eventually draw some basic conclusions from Mr. Simon's book. First, individualism and collectivism are equally wrong. They undermine or denounce the very fundamentals of democratic philosophy and degrade human nature; both frustrate the organic functions of political society, causing thereby unrest and unhappiness. Second, it is the personality of man that matters, its growth, protection, and responsible social action. The concept of true democratic government asks for a vast area of local autonomy and decentralisation within the framework of a pluralistic, free society. And third, what the author says about the universal suffrage holds true for democratic government as such: "If at a given moment of history it got hold of the human conscience, from then on it can never be rejected, though it may call for reinterpretation" (p. 78).

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ST. THOMAS AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: THREE INTERPRETATIONS. By William Bryar. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951. Pp. xxv + 252. $5.00.

The author of this book sets out to discover a consistent terminological structure in St. Thomas which can be used as the basis of an interpretation of the first Way, and the eventual outcome of his study is not one but three such separate and self-consistent structures. Beginning with three groups of initial statements (sentences asserting the existence of various objects, sentences stating the essences or attributes of different supposits, and mixed sentences involving abstract statements about essences and properties or attributes), Mr. Bryar then characterizes each group by an appropriate terminology which is further analyzed to give other terms that are proper to that particular group and cannot be used outside of it. On the basis of these three distinct sets of terms he proposes three separate interpretations of the first Way.

Mr. Bryar's method, it must be remarked, is not a sound one. The metaphysics and natural theology of St. Thomas were not conceived as verbal structures but as explanations of reality; and, as a consequence, the words which he uses in that explanation are not to be given a meaning with a view to an attempt at a univocally consistent terminology. In theory such a method is incorrect as an effort to get to the meaning of St. Thomas. And in practice it is impossible of execution. The author is continually forced to make options in the direction of one or another metaphysical interpretation not based on a mere study of terms.

When, for example, Mr. Bryar is discussing the relationship of supposit and nature, or supposit and property, he says that one possible relationship would be that of identity, while "the alternative relation for the two components would be nonidentity in all respects or only in some respects, which would be the basis for our new term and meaning, 'caused' " (p. 94). We are then told that "the term 'caused' suggests that we must go beyond the thing for the total explanation of the two components and their joining" (*ibid.*). Such a step, however, is altogether too facile. As a mere *name* for the relation of nonidentity between supposit and attribute, the word "caused" does not suggest anything; it can suggest something only if it is given a significance based on a metaphysical understanding of a concrete supposit which is not identical with its attributes. But Mr. Bryar has given himself no means of deriving such a significance for the word

"caused." He is compelled to make an option independently of his linguistic analysis, and there is evidence to indicate that this choice is made on the basis of a shuffling of the views of Thomistic commentators.

Besides the general inapplicability of the method, there is a further quite fundamental positive error. That error is to assume that one can describe St. Thomas's thought by a process of linguistic analysis based on purely logical division. Mr. Bryar, for example, determines that sentences such as "The lump of coal is being" can be properly characterized by the two terms *essentia* and *esse;* and he then proceeds to affirm that all such sentences will be included in the two groups formed by the two logical possibilities for the conjunction of the terms *essentia* and *esse:* identity and nonidentity of the terms. "The identity of the two components," he states, "gives rise to a new term, 'the uncreated.' . . . The alternative relation for the two components would be nonidentity, which relation would be the basis for our new term and meaning, 'creature' " (p. 39). Such a division into identity and nonidentity is quite neat logically, and it reminds one of Frege's and Wittgenstein's logistic method of truth-table analysis, which is based on all possible combinations of truth values for the elements of a compound proposition. Unfortunately for the author of this book, it is not so neat metaphysically and is not a possible approach to the meaning of St. Thomas. Simple nonidentity of essence and *esse* is mere nonbeing; it does not describe a creature. The essence and *esse* of a creature are not identified, of course, but neither can their relation be adequately represented by the term "non-identity." The essence and *esse* of a creature are distinct yet transcendentally related—a relationship not suggested by logical division of terms, but discovered in an understanding of reality.

We need not consider Mr. Bryar's application of his findings to the first Way. In the formulation of his method he has not succeeded in presenting a possible meaning for the terms in the vocabulary of St. Thomas; and though the consequent analysis of the proof from motion for the existence of God may help to explain the meaning of some of Mr. Bryar's previously obscure phrases, it does not, nor can it, clarify the meaning of St. Thomas. The author cautiously avers that his interpretation is only hypothetical and is merely a "possible explanation of the workings of the *Summa*" (p. 30), yet in point of fact it is not a possible explanation of anything in the writings of St. Thomas.

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NOTES ON FOREIGN BOOKS

Essai Sur L'Organisation de la Connaissance Entre 10 et 14 Ans. By E. Michaud. Paris: J. Vrin, 1949. Pp. 265.

This is largely a work of experimental psychology. The author considers the age period in question as the critical one wherein the child passes from the "prelogical" stage of infantile thought to rational, adult forms of thinking. The work is done much in the tradition of Piaget. Perhaps because the analysis of so-called "adult" thought is rationalistic, the contrast between child and adult is overstressed. But there are some illuminating experiments on what happens when a mind is not prepared to advance to a certain conception.

The Ontological Proof in Thomistic and Kantian Interpretation. By Olle Herrlin. Uppsala: Lundequistska Bokhandeln; Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1950. Pp. 115. Paper, 4:50 kroner.

This study is undertaken from the viewpoint of the philosophy of religion. The author finds that the criticisms of St. Thomas and Kant both concern the distinctive nature of the existential act. The analysis of St. Thomas is based largely on secondary sources, but on well-chosen ones. An interesting parallel is drawn between the Thomistic analogy and the Kantian *Ding an sich*. The author concludes that if the argument of St. Anselm is taken philosophically, the criticisms of St. Thomas and Kant have destroyed it. But he thinks that the attitude of "faith seeking understanding" is untouched by the criticisms, and he believes that this patristic attitude is different from, and superior to, the Thomistic.

Saggio Sulla Dialettica Della Realtà Spirituale. By Gallo Galli. 3d ed. Turin: Gheroni, 1950. Pp. 255.

This is a study of method and at the same time of reality from the point of view of that kind of personal idealism which is sometimes called "spiritualism" and seems to owe a great deal to Renouvier. The first part of the book deals with the nature of "act," act being understood in the sense of activity and particularly of conscious activity. The second part deals with the plurality of knowledge and goes on to discuss the existence of God. The third section deduces four forms of spiritual reality. The fourth and final section deals with value.

The third edition has some additions and modifications, which, the author tells us, do not disturb the original structure of the work.

Manuale Philosophiae. By Joannes di Napoli. 4 vols. Turin: Marietti, 1950-51.

The first volume of this Thomistic *cursus* contains a general introduction to philosophy, logic, and cosmology; the second volume contains psychology, gnoseology, and ontology; the third, rational theology, ethics, and small sections on pedagogy, aesthetics, and historiography. The fourth volume is called a supplement, containing, among other things, a history of philosophy and a glossary of terms.

The text was written explicitly for seminary students. The author has a simple and smooth Latin style, and the student's comprehension is aided by various typographical devices.

As far as the doctrine is concerned, the emphasis is on "soundness and clarity." A book of this sort necessarily has to be very introductory in scope and often superficial. It can be used with some success if, as the author hopes, the students read widely and well in the great philosophical classics.

L'Idée de Macrocosmos et de Microcosmos dans le Timée de Platon. By Anders Olerud. Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells, 1951. Pp. 236. 15 kroner.

This dissertation tries to throw light on the relations between man and the universe as they are to be found in the *Timaeus*. The author studies ancient Greek mythology and the religions and traditions of the peoples of the Near East to find common themes. From a great variety of sources, he draws a picture of man as a universe and of the universe as a kind of magnified human being. He maintains, moreover, that these conceptions are essentially religious and that similar speculations in Plato, no matter how refined they have become, serve as religious myth.

Der Kranke Mensch. By Georg Siegmund. Fulda: Fuldaer Verlagsanstalt, 1951. Pp. 304. DM 8.80.

The author of this work has written on psychology, philosophy, and theology. The author of the foreword, Dr. Josef Boekamp, head of the Guilds of St. Luke and St. Cosmas and Damian, tells us that part of the contents of this work has been presented to the members of these guilds, who have found it of great interest and value. The author's purpose is to set out a picture of the whole man who is to be cured, to point out the finality of sickness in human life, and the orientation of medicine to health. A doctor or a medical student would profit greatly from the reading of this book. An English translation, it would seem, is highly to be desired.

Introducción a la Metafísica. By Angel González Alvarez. Mendoza, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1951. Pp. 393.

The metaphysics the author has in mind is Thomism, understood in the traditional abstractive, inductive-deductive fashion. The work is divided into four parts: the concept of metaphysics, its possibility, its method, and its sources. In each part there are an introduction to the problem, a history, and a solution. Each part is divided into a few chapters, each chapter into a number of articles. Each article concludes with a summary and a number of readings from various sources. The analytic table of contents takes up seven pages of small type. The work seems to be excessively systematic, and it is difficult to see what sort of course the author had in mind. Perhaps the book might be useful to a teacher of metaphysics to help him prepare a few classes of introduction to his subject.

COMPENDIUM ETHICAE SOCIALIS. By Georgius Jarlot, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 192.

The author, who is professor of sociology in the Gregorian University, proposes to divide ethics into general ethics and social ethics. Individual ethics, which is thus left out of consideration, is to be taken care of in moral theology. Hence, it is apparent that this book is written for seminarians. The author maintains that, whereas general ethics is deductive and metaphysical in character, social ethics depends to a great extent on various positive sciences. This dependence, of course, is material (in the sense that various facts to be considered have to be drawn from the positive sciences), not formal, for ethics is a distinct kind of knowledge, normative, not descriptive.

The topics covered are the nature of society in general, the family, economic ethics, political ethics, and international ethics. The author proceeds by setting up the problem in each area, then stating and proving his thesis. However, proofs are not formalized; they remain embedded in the explanation of them. Definitions are given, as well as some useful readings at the end of each section. The use of the material from the positive sciences is rather small and superficial and should be considered sufficient only for an absolutely minimum knowledge.

Some points might be selected for special comment. To prove that society is natural, the author holds that "self-consciousness" is impossible without society. He makes no attempt to distinguish the various meanings of the term or the various forms that self-consciousness might take. The argument might perhaps be made into a good one; as it stands it is purely a prioristic and somewhat equivocal. Concerning socio-economic problems, the author offers his solution in terms of the family wage and state control. He mentions a corporative solution but says it has little pertinence, except as an unattainable ideal—and indeed the a prioristic structure he offers has little pertinence and seems more like a nightmare than an ideal. He seems to make no reference at all to the efforts now being made to embody social justice at least to some extent in institutions that are gradually taking shape. Concerning the origin of the state, the author says that a contract has absolutely nothing to do with it. Yet in his preliminary discussion he had included material which would have enabled him to distinguish several stages in the formation of a political society, and these distinctions would have let him find a proper place for the consent of the governed.

There is no index.

INTRODUZIONE ALLO STUDIO DI KANT. By Sofia Vanni Rovighi. 2d ed. Milan: Carlo Marzorati, 1951. Pp. xi + 244. Paper, 1300 lire.

This is useful even to non-Italian students because of the references to important Italian studies on Kant which are often overlooked in other introductions to Kant. The second edition contains a number of additions. The "bio-bibliographical note" has been considerably expanded. The second chapter, on the writings of Kant between 1747 and

1770, is entirely new. References to the more recent literature have been added throughout.

Theoriae Corpusculares Typicae in Universitatibus Societatis Jesu Saeculi xviii et Monadologia Kantiana. By Joseph Fejér, S.J. Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1951. Pp. 69. Paper.

This is a study of the corpuscular doctrines of four Jesuit philosophers, Joseph Mangold of Ingolstadt, Gaspar Sagner of Prague, Roger Boscovich of Rome, and Benedict Stattler of Innsbruck. In the first part, the author treats the corpuscular doctrines, considers their teachings on extension, quantity, and divisibility, and criticizes their positions. In the second part, he analyzes the notion of "force" employed by these authors and compares their doctrines with the "monadology" of Kant. There is a bibliography, but no index.

Foi Chrétienne et Pensée Contemporaine. By Albert Dondeyne. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1951. Pp. viii + 224. Paper, $2.00.

This book is a "dialogue," as the author says, between Thomistic thought and contemporary philosophy, or, as the Germans would call it, an *Auseinandersetzung*. The first chapter discusses the general meaning of the encyclical *Humani Generis*. Chapters two to five inclusive take up four points with which modern thought concerns itself and criticize or relate them to Thomistic thought. These problems are historicity and contemporary relativism, the irrational (especially existence) and reason, the problem of Thomism (which deals with rationalism and empiricism in relation to Thomistic noetics), and the life of faith and freedom of enquiry. A brief conclusion completes the work. There is no index.

La Conquista de America y el Descubrimiento del Moderno Derecho Internacional. Estudios Sobre las Ideas de Francisco de Vitoria. "Publicaciones de La Fundacion Vitoria y Suarez." Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1951. Pp. 109.

This volume is the first publication of the Fundacion Vitoria y Suarez, whose purpose is to foster the study and propagation of the ideas of the two great Spanish thinkers. The introduction to this book is an address by Samuel W. Medrano, which explains the role of Vitoria's thought in the development of Argentina. Atilio Dell'Oro Maini shows that Vitoria's thought has value for the modern age. Octavio N. Derisi singles out the new methods of Vitoria and evaluates their influence upon philosophy and theology. Faustino J. Legón summarizes Vitoria's doctrine of the state. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno takes up the relation between political sovereignty and the international community. Antonio de Luna analyzes the crisis in international law. Enrique Gómez Arboleya asserts the undying influence of Vitoria. José Torre Revello and Rubén González, O.P., present brief bibliographical and chronological notes.

Die Idee der Paideia. By Theodor Ballauff. "Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung," Band VII. Meisenheim am Glan:

Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1952. Pp. 80. Paper, DM 8; cloth, DM 9.80.

This is a study of Plato's "myth of the cave" as embodying a theory of education as well as a picture of the nature of philosophy. The author makes a very detailed study of the text. He tries to show that an educational theory must rest on a philosophy. Finally (pp. 53-78), he considers the notion of philosophical education as presented by Parmenides and shows that the Platonic theory is both a consummation and a transformation of earlier Greek theories.

Au Coeur du Spinozisme. By Paul Siwek, S.J. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1952. Pp. 252.

The author of this monograph has already published two books on Spinoza, *L'Ame et le corps d'après Spinoza* and *Spinoza et le panthéisme religieux*. The present work elaborates certain points of discussion and critique which were only touched on in passing in the previous works.

According to the author, there are five points which can be considered decisive, and without them the philosophy of Spinoza cannot be understood. These are free will, finality, the existence of God, divine revelation, and the rights of man. On each of these points the author carefully expounds Spinoza's thought, as much as possible in his own words, and gives many references. But he is not content merely to expound; he also criticizes the method of argumentation or the premises, mostly from the viewpoint of an Aristotelian psychology and metaphysics.

La Simpatia nella Morale e nel Diritto. By Luigi Bagolini. Bologna: Cesare Zuffi, 1952. Pp. 119. Paper, 800 lire.

This essay is a study in the thought of Adam Smith. The first chapter studies Smith's critique of Hobbes and Hutcheson. The second chapter considers the function of sympathy and the sympathetic imagination in relation to human society. The third chapter deals with the objectivity of the evaluations (judgments of value) based on sympathy. The fourth chapter deals with juridical valuation; it takes up the relations between Hume and Smith. The fifth chapter considers utility and sympathy and compares the theory of Bentham with that of Smith.

Der Mensch in Seinem Dasein. Philosophische Anthropologie. By Georg Siegmund. Fulda: author, 1952. Part I, 8½″ x 11″, mimeographed, pp. 132.

In this part of a book on the philosophy of man, the author covers questions about the nature of man in general, the relation between spirit and nature, the awakening of spirit, monistic views of man (materialism, idealism, biologism), and the unity of man. The study is noteworthy because of the careful attention given to contemporary thought, especially to the biologically orientated "philosophies of life" and to existentialism.

In Spirito e Verità. By Michele Federico Sciacca. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1952. Pp. 305. Paper, 1000 lire.

This is a collection of a hundred and thirteen essays by one of Italy's foremost thinkers. Many of the essays have appeared in *Humanitas* and *Logos;* some have appeared under the author's own name, others under the pseudonyms of "Goriano di Gona" and "Apricus"; still others under other pseudonyms. In general, the essays belong to the genre of general philosophical and ethical literature.

Nacimiento y Desarrollo de la Filosofia en el Rio de la Plata, 1536-1810. By Guillermo Furlong, S.J. Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1952. Pp. 758.

Father Furlong is one of the outstanding historians of Argentina. In the present extensive study he traces in considerable detail the origin and development of philosophy in Argentina. In the first part of the book, after an introductory chapter on Spanish philosophy during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, he studies the Scholastic philosophers who flourished in Spanish America and especially in the Rio de la Plata from 1536 to 1773. In the second part he notes the influence of Cartesianism, but indicates that anti-Cartesians, Suarezians, Thomists, and Scotists were to be found at the same time. In the third part eclecticism is the theme; yet the other currents continue on through, and into, the foundation of the present republic of Argentina. During this period, according to the author, Suarezian influences became quite strong. An indication of the detail into which the author enters is to be found in the seventeen-page index of proper names.

The author promises companion volumes on the history of theology and jurisprudence.

Le Cardinal Mercier et L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de Louvain. By L. De Raeymaeker. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1952. Pp. 275. Paper, 145 fr. belges.

An understanding of the remarkable revival of Thomistic studies during the last sixty years is impossible without a knowledge of the work of Cardinal Mercier. This volume, written in connection with the celebration of the centenary of the birth of the founder of the Institut Supérieur, is written by the present president of that world-famous institution.

The first chapter is a biography of the Cardinal. The second chapter, by far the longest, is a history of the origin and development of the Institut Supérieur as long as the Cardinal remained at the head of it. The third chapter brings the history up to 1948, when the presidency was given to its present incumbent. Appendices give some of the important pontifical documents concerned with the Institut, and, for purposes of comparison, programs of courses for the years 1894-95, 1901-2, and 1951-52. There is an index of proper names.

This is a warm and yet accurately written biography and history. Libraries will want a copy and so will, we are sure, many of that great

number of students the world over who owe their Thomistic formation to Cardinal Mercier and the Institut.

LEÇONS DE LOGIQUE ALGÉBRIQUE. By Haskell B. Curry. Paris: Gauthier-Villars; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1952. Pp. 163. Paper, $4.86.

This is the second volume in series A of the "Collection de Logique Mathématique," under the direction of Mme Destouches-Février. The author says that the text was prepared for students who have some training in either logic or mathematics, but not both; it presupposes familiarity with the techniques of abstract thinking, but not with the content of either logic or mathematics. Thus the book fills a need that is not exactly met by other texts.

After a brief introduction, the author expounds the theory of formal systems in a very clear and simple way. Then he takes up logical algebras, lattices, implication, negation, and the more complicated algebras. There are a bibliography and an index.

The book is printed by offset from typed copy which uses printed symbols and a justified right-hand margin. The price seems very high for the type of printing and the paper used.

THE "BIBLIOTECA DE AUTORES CRISTIANOS," begun in Spain in 1945, is now available in this country from The Catholic Classics, Harlingen, Texas. This series, which has been highly praised by European scholars, is distinguished by its scholarly standards, fine printing, and very moderate price. Among the authors included are St. Anselm, St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

AARON, R. I. *The Theory of Universals.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. viii + 247. $4.25.

This study of universals falls into two parts. The first part is historical, though it is not intended to be a history of doctrines of universals. The author studies only certain writers whose theories seemed "worth thinking about"; the author selects Porphyry, Locke, Berkeley, and the rationalists, Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. The second part deals with the reality of the problem of universals, general words, ultimate forms, common qualities, dispositions, and concepts, and concludes with a summary delineating the author's theory of universals. The notion of dispositions is basic to the author's analysis; though this is strikingly akin to the habit theory of C. S. Peirce, the American philosopher is not mentioned. In discussing qualities, the author holds that common qualities can be found in reality, but not common things; we can only find similar things, he holds. He interprets Aristotelian realism as holding that there must be an underlying identity for every similarity, and therefore rejects it, as well as all other realism; he also rejects conceptualism and nominalism. The briefest statement of his theory is that "universals are natural recurrences; universals are principles of grouping or classifying" (p. 241).

The author is well acquainted with contemporary doctrines and carries on his discussion in an intelligent and orderly manner. Yet his failure to understand Aristotelian realism lessens the value of his work very much.

ACHORN, ERIK (ed.). *Beaconlights of Western Culture.* 3 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. $5.00 ea.; $12.50 the set.

ANDERSON, C. ARNOLD. *Human Nature.* Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Lib., 1952. Pp. 16.

ANDERSON, JAMES FRANCIS. *The Cause of Being. The Philosophy of Creation in St. Thomas.* St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952. Pp. vii + 172. $3.25.

This study of the origin of the world is built upon the doctrine of St. Thomas. It considers, as a preliminary, what is meant by the cause of being as being. Then it takes up creation, both active and passive. Two chapters take up special problems connected with creation: the possibility of an eternal world and whether there can be an actually infinite multitude. Finally, two consequences of creation are considered: the ubiquity of God and finality in creation.

The book is recommended reading for all who want to understand what St. Thomas has to say about creation. It should prove valuable supplementary reading for courses in natural theology.

ANSHEN, RUTH NANDA (ed.). *Moral Principles of Action.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1952. Pp. 732. $7.50.

ARISTOTLE. *Aristotle's* Metaphysics. Tr. by Richard Hope. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 411. $5.00.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *Sermons for Christmas and Epiphany.* Tr. from the Latin and annotated by Thomas Comerford Lawler. Westminster: Newman Press, 1952. Pp. 249. $3.25.

BALZ, ALBERT G. A., and OTHERS. *A Survey of the Humanities in Southern Institutions.* Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Lib., 1952. Pp. 26.

BARBER, BERNARD. *Science and the Social Order.* Foreword by Robert K. Merton. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952. Pp. 311. $4.50.

BAREA, ARTURO. *Unamuno.* Tr. from the Spanish by Ilsa Barea. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 61. $2.50.

BARTA, FRANK R. *The Moral Theory of Behavior.* Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1952. Pp. 45. $2.00.

BATCHELOR, JAMES H. *Operations Research. A Preliminary Annotated Bibliography.* Cleveland: Case Institute of Technology, 1952. Pp. 95.

Operations Research began as a brilliantly successful method of solving war-time problems and has since been used in industry, merchandising, the handling of traffic flow, and so forth. Some attempts have been made to state the logical theory of the method; the results are disappointing. Two factors that seem to be very important are the function of extrinsic analogy (metaphor) in scientific thinking, and the application of statistical methods to observational data (this last point has been stressed by various writers).

The present bibliography is a most helpful tool for the further work that needs to be done in the theoretical background of operations research.

BAUMER, FRANKLIN LE VAN (ed.). *Main Currents of Western Thought.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. Pp. 715. $7.50.

BAUMGARDT, DAVID. *Bentham and the Ethics of Today.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 598. $9.00.

BERGLER, EDMUND. *The Superego: Unconscious Conscience.* New York: Grune & Stratton, 1952. Pp. 367. $6.75.

BISNO, HERBERT. *The Philosophy of Social Work.* Introd. by Eduard C. Lindeman. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1952. Pp. x + 143. $3.25.

This is a study of the generally accepted philosophy under which social work is conducted. The author's own philosophy, as is stated in the introduction, is that of scientific humanism. And Mr. Lindeman goes on to remark that "he frequently attempts to clarify his position by comparing his principles with those advocated by Roman Catholic social workers" (p. v). Evidently the author wants to be fair in

his presentation and makes use of profuse documentation. But unfortunately his understanding of the positions he disagrees with is very defective (see, for example, the alleged "Roman Catholic position" on sex, pp. 17-19, or the "theological concept" of free will, pp. 8-9, 14-15).

The chapters deal with the nature of the human individual, group and individual relations, methods of social work, social maladjustment and social change, and a program of action for social workers.

BONAVENTURE, ST. *The Mind's Road to God.* Introd. by G. Boas. New York: Liberal Arts Press; March, 1953. 40¢

BREWER, JOHN M. *Wellsprings of Democracy. Guidance for Local Societies.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. xii + 232. $4.50.

The purpose of this book is to encourage the practice of democratic procedures in local societies and to provide a simplified manual for the operation of such societies. The results of practising democracy on a small scale will lead, the author believes, to an improvement in democracy on the national and even on the international scale. There is an appendix, containing sample bylaws, some definitions of terms, and a short bibliography. There is an index.

BURKHARDT, FREDERICK (ed.). *The Cleavage in Our Culture.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 210. $3.00.

CAJETAN, THOMAS DE VIO, CARDINAL. *The Analogy of Names.* Tr. by Edward A. Bushinski, C.S.Sp., and Henry J. Koren, C.S.Sp. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1953. About $2.25; paper, about $1.50.

CARRIÈRE, GASTON, O.M.I. *Précis de méthodologie à l'usage des étudiants en philosophie.* Ottawa: Les Editions de l'Université, 1951. Pp. 104. Paper.

This is a manual prepared for the use of graduate students in philosophy. The first chapter takes up scientific study and its instruments; the second, preparation for scholarly investigation; and the third, the preparation of a thesis as a result of such study. There is a short bibliography.

CHALMERS, GORDON KEITH. *The Republic and the Person.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952. Pp. 270. $4.00.

CONANT, JAMES B. *Modern Science and Modern Man.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. v + 111. $2.25.

CRANE, RONALD S., and OTHERS. *Critics and Criticism—Ancient and Modern.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 626. $6.00.

CRANNY, TITUS, S.A. *The Moral Obligation of Voting.* "The Catholic University of American Studies in Sacred Theology," No. 70; Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1952. Pp. xxvii + 152. Paper.

The subject of this dissertation is of very great importance in social ethics. Philosophers will be interested in it as an indication of the teaching of a great number of writers and will note a shift from a consideration of voting as a function in itself nonmoral to a widespread teaching that the citizen in a democratic or representative form of government has a moral obligation to vote. The ethical arguments for this position are presented very briefly, as is to be expected in a theological discussion. There are a detailed bibliography and an index.

Decennial Index to Philosophical Literature, 1939-1950. New York: Russell F. Moore Co., 1952. Pp. 115. $4.50.

DINGLE, HERBERT. *The Scientific Adventure.* New York: British Book Centre, 1952. Pp. 382. $6.75.

DORAN, F. S. A. *Mind: A Social Phenomenon.* New York: Wm. Sloane Associates; Jan., 1953. $3.00.

DOUGHERTY, KENNETH. *Cosmology.* Peekskill, N. Y.: Graymoor Press, 1952. Pp. 185. $3.00.

DOUGLAS, PAUL. *Ethics in Government.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 123. $2.50.

EMBRY, JOHN. *The Namic Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. ix + 238. $3.75.

By "namic" the author means "pertaining to action rather than structure" (cf. pp. 3, 8). The first nine chapters are philosophical; the last six pertain more to religion. In the philosophical part, the author surveys some philosophical systems (in chapters 2, 4 and 7), gives his logic in chapter 3, discusses extension in chapter 5, and life in chapters 6, 8, and 9. Though the author appears to be widely read and deeply thoughtful, the work seems never to have been subjected to any rigorous discipline of thought, organization, or style. In addition, printer's errors are liberally scattered throughout.

English Institute Essays, 1951. Ed. by Alan S. Downer. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Oct., 1952. Pp. 221. $3.00.

FAIRCHILD, HOXIE NEALE. *Religious Perspectives in College Teaching.* New York: Ronald Press, 1952. Pp. 470. $4.50.

FARRELL, WALTER, O.P., and HEALY, MARTIN J. *My Way of Life.* Brooklyn, Confraternity of the Precious Blood. Pp. 640. $1.35.

FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN. *The Autobiography and Selections from His Other Writings.* Ed. by Herbert W. Schneider. "American Heritage Series"; New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952. Pp. xx + 218. Paper, 75¢

This volume contains the text of the *Autobiography* edited by Max Farrand (pp. 1-168) and selections from the *Humanitarian Essays* (pp. 171-92), along with the pamphlet, "Information to Those Who Would Remove to America," and "The Way to Wealth," from *Poor Richard.*

The editor gives a chronology of Franklin's life, a short introduction to his thought (pp. ix-xiv), and a selected bibliography (pp. xv-xvii); the general editor, Oskar Piest, contributes a note on the text (pp. xviii-xx). The edition also contains explanatory notes (pp. 210-18).

This is an excellently printed and convenient edition.

From an Abundant Spring. The Walter Farrell Memorial Volume of the Thomist. Ed. by the staff of the *Thomist.* New York: Kenedy & Sons, 1952. Pp. xii + 555. $7.50.

The twenty-six essays in this memorial volume range from theology through philosophy to literary criticism. If there is a common theme, in addition to the desire of honoring the memory of a great man, it is in the level on which they are written. Very few of the essays are scholarly contributions which would be concerned with the technical elaboration of Thomism or with historical studies; most of the essays deal with modern problems or the application of Thomism to contemporary areas. The book will appeal particularly to undergraduate teachers who will want to assign one or the other essay for supplementary reading and to persons who know some philosophy and theology without being professionally philosophers or theologians.

There is no index.

FUNG, YU-LAN. *A History of Chinese Philosophy.* Vol. I. Tr. from the Chinese by Derk Bodde. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 489. $6.00.

GARDINER, PATRICK. *Nature of Historical Explanation.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 146. $2.00.

GARNETT, A. CAMPBELL. *The Moral Nature of Man.* New York, Ronald Press Co. Pp. 277. $3.75.

GOETHE. *Faust I.* Introd. by B. Q. Morgan. New York: Liberal Arts Press; March, 1953. 60¢

HARTSHORNE, CHARLES. *Reality as Social Process.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952. $4.00.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH. *Introduction to His Philosophy of History.* Introd. by R. S. Hartman. New York: Liberal Arts Press; March, 1953. 65¢

HEMPEL, CARL G. *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 96. $2.00.

HESIOD. *Theogony.* Introd. by N. O. Brown. New York: Liberal Arts Press; March, 1953. 50¢

HOROWITZ, IRVING LOUIS. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Giordano Bruno.* New York: Coleman-Ross Co., 1952. Pp. viii + 150. $3.00.

This study of Bruno is concerned mainly with his philosophy of nature, his metaphysics, and his philosophical method. The first part is devoted to science and natural philosophy and takes up, in successive chapters, the revolution in cosmology, the heritage of previous philosophy, nature, man, and the infinite universe, and dialectics and reality. The second part deals with the "paradox" of system and method—the author holds that Bruno's system is "closed" (that is, the opposites are reconciled only once, in the Infinite), whereas his method should lead to a system of continuous or dialectical resolution. In this part, chapters take up substance and change, mechanism, pluralism, pluralism and monadism, the category of process, and the place of reason.

According to the author, all previous studies of Bruno have been one-sided, incomplete, and uncritically interpretative (pp. 17-20); his own study is to be better because it is consciously interpretative. The author subscribes to the theses of dialectical materialism and in the light of these preconceptions tries to interpret Bruno's "ideology." Lenin, Marx, and Engels are the authorities who give the correct interpretation to the history of ideas. Hence, though the author has chosen a good philosophical problem, his work on it is not of great value.

There is an index of names (including brief biographical notes); there is no index of subjects; there is no bibliography. The book contains far too many printing mistakes.

HOUGH, LYNN HAROLD. *Great Humanists.* Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1952. Pp. 220. $3.50.

HUME, DAVID. *Political Essays.* Introd. by C. W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Feb., 1953. 75¢

Hydrogen Bomb and International Control: Technical and Background Information, The. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 14. 15¢

IVANOV, VYACHESLAV. *Freedom and the Tragic Life.* Foreword by Sir Maurice Bowra. Tr. from the Russian by Norman Cameron. Ed. by S. Konovalov. New York: Noonday Press, 1952. Pp. 166. $3.50.

JONES, WILLIAM THOMAS. *A History of Western Philosophy.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952. Pp. 1060. $8.75.

JORDAN, E. *Theory of Legislation.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 490. $7.00.

KAISER, C. HILLIS. *An Essay on Method.* New Brunswick, Rutgers Univ. Press. Pp. 169. $3.25.

KECSKEMETI, PAUL. *Meaning, Communication, and Value.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 356. $8.50.

KIERKEGAARD, SOREN AABYE. *The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard Presented by W. H. Auden.* "Living Thoughts Library"; New York: David McKay Co., 1952. Pp. 225. $2.50.

KLINKE, WILLIBALD. *Kant for Everyman.* Tr. from the German by Michael Bullock. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 144. $2.50.

LECLER, JOSEPH, S.J. *The Two Sovereignties. The Relationship Between Church and State.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. x + 186. $3.75.

This is a presentation of the Catholic doctrine of the sovereignty of the state in relation to the Church. The first part of the book is an analysis of the Church's doctrine on the distinction of the two societies, their agreement, and the order that obtains between them. This last point is divided into two theoretical explanations: the theories of direct and indirect power of the Church in temporal matters; the author holds the second theory.

The second part of the book considers various other theories (notably those of Caesaro-papism and separatism) and the historical situations in which they arose. The book unfortunately has no index.

This book is extremely important for all who are interested in political theory or in practical affairs. Anyone who writes about Church-state relations in the future without reference to this book will have to be convicted either of ignorance or malice.

LOCKE, JOHN. *The Second Treatise of Government.* Ed. by Thomas P. Peardon. "The Library of Liberal Arts"; New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952. Pp. xxviii + 139. Paper, 75¢

Locke's very influential treatise on political theory is now made available in a very well-printed and very cheap edition. The editor has contributed an excellent introduction (pp. vii-xxii) and a selected bibliography (pp. xxiii-xxv). The general editor, Oskar Piest, has added a two-page note on the text. The editor points out that Locke had his own version of natural-law theory; he does not point out clearly enough how Lockian natural-law theory differs from other theories of natural law.

MARCEL, GABRIEL. *Man against Mass Society.* Tr. from the French by G. S. Fraser. Foreword by Donald Mackinnon. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952. Pp. 205. $4.50.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Range of Reason.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1952. Pp. xii + 227. $3.50.

Ten of the seventeen chapters in this book are translations from *Raison et Raisons;* the others have not previously been printed in book form. The book is divided into two parts: "Human Knowledge and Metaphysics," and "Faith and the Human Community." The longer essays are valuable contributions which philosophers will be delighted to have more easily available. The first part is made up of essays called "On Human Knowledge," "On Artistic Judgment," "On Knowledge through Connaturality," "Philosophical Co-operation and Intellectual Justice," "The Immortality of the Soul," "The Immanent Dialectic of the First Act of Freedom," "A New Approach to God," and "The Meaning of Contemporary Atheism." The second part contains, among others, essays called "The End of Machiavellian-

ism," "The Pluralist Principle in Democracy," "The Possibilities for Co-operation in a Divided World," and "Christian Humanism."

There is an index of proper names.

MAXIMOFF, G. P. *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952. $6.00.

MCCULLOCH, WARREN S. *Finality and Form.* Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1952. Pp. 67. $3.75.

MEAD, HUNTER. *Types and Problems of Philosophy.* Rev. ed. New York: Henry Holt & Co.; March, 1953. Pp. 480. $4.25.

MENCZER, BÉLA (ed.). *Catholic Political Thought, 1789-1848.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1952. Pp. 213. $3.75.

MENGES, MATTHEW C., O.F.M. *The Concept of Univocity regarding the Predication of God and Creature according to William Ockham.* St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1952. Pp. xi + 196. Paper.

This study concerns univocity according to Ockham, and particularly the univocity of being. The first chapter studies the principles of the solution, the theory of knowledge and of signification. The second takes up univocity in relation to signification. The third chapter relates univocity to similarity. The fourth chapter compares equivocation and analogy. The fifth chapter applies these doctrines to predication about God and creatures. There are a bibliography and an index.

MUKERJEE, RADHAKAMAL. *The Dynamics of Morals.* Introd. by Gardner Murphy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1952. Pp. 557. $6.00.

NORTHROP, FILMER STUART CUCKOW. *The Taming of the Nations.* New York, Macmillan Co. Pp. 374. $5.00.

OESTERLE, JOHN A. *Logic. The Art of Defining and Reasoning.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Pp. xviii + 232. Paper, $2.75.

This book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the three acts of the mind: concept, composition and division, and reasoning. Each chapter ends with a set of questions, and most of the chapters have one or more exercises. There is an appendix (pp. 207-25), containing translations of the first lesson of St. Thomas's *Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* and the first three lessons of St. Thomas's *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation;* the latter selection also gives a translation of Aristotle's work.

There is an index.

PAINE, THOMAS. *Common Sense and Other Writings.* Ed. with an introd. by N. Adkins. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Jan., 1953. 75¢

PALMER, HAROLD. *The Philosophy of Psychiatry.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. ix + 70. $2.75.

The purpose of this book is to establish a basis for theory and practice of psychiatry that will be self-consistent and easily communicable. The method which the author uses is largely that of semantical analysis. The subject matter of psychiatry, the author holds, is primarily the "self," or the individual human person. The primary entities of psychiatric discourse are awareness, consciousness, self, thought, and mind. The secondary entities are personality, character, morale, group, and society. The clinical entities are divided into neuroses and psychoses.

The author realizes the serious confusion in basic concepts that can be found among writers in the area of psychiatry. The solution by means of semantical analysis is too superficial; the author does not understand the function of deductive theory in science or the proper place of metaphysics in a philosophical account.

PARSONS, TALCOTT; BALES, R. FREED; and SHILS, EDWARD A. *Working Papers Toward the General Theory of Action.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952. $3.00.

PLATO. *Five Dialogues.* "Everyman's Library"; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1952. Pp. 308. $1.25.

POINCARÉ, HENRI. *Science and Hypothesis.* Tr. from the French. Preface by J. Larmor. New York: Dover Publs., 1952. Pp. 281. $1.25.

————. *Science and Method.* Tr. from the French by Francis Maitland. Preface by Bertrand Russell. New York: Dover Publs., 1952. Pp. 288. $1.25.

ROBACK, A. A. *History of American Psychology.* Cambridge: Sci-Art Publishers, 1952. Pp. 500. $6.00.

ROMANELL, PATRICK. *Making of the Mexican Mind.* Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. $3.75.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Persons and Places.* Vol. III. *My Host the World.* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.

SCOTT, NATHAN A., JR. *Rehearsals of Discomposure.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Oct., 1952. Pp. xv + 294. $4.00.

SOULE, GEORGE. *Ideas of the Great Economists.* New York, Viking Press. Pp. 224. $3.50.

STEENBERGHEN, CANON FERNAND VAN. *Ontology.* Tr. by Martin J. Flynn. New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1952.

STEINER, RUDOLF. *Man's Being, His Destiny and World-Evolution.* New York: Anthroposophic Press, 1952. Pp. 114. $2.50.

STRAUSS, LEO. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 200. $4.00.

Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Ed. by Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. $5.00.

SULLIVAN, SISTER HELEN, O.S.B. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Natural and Mathematical Sciences.* New York: Vantage Press, 1952. Pp. xxi + 188. $3.75.

This textbook is designed for college seniors and is a development of the author's earlier *Christian Approach to Science.* After an introduction by the Most Reverend Joseph M. Marling, the author explains the point of view and the plan of the book. Several chapters of a more general nature follow, explaining the necessity for a critique of the sciences, the hierarchy of speculative knowledge (discussed in relation to the three types of abstraction), the relation of knower to the known. Then follow three historical chapters, on Greek theories of nature, scientism, and mathematicism. The eighth chapter then takes up the nature of the philosophy of nature. This is followed by two chapters on the physical and the biological sciences. Mathematics is treated more fully, in three chapters. The last four chapters again deal with more general matters: the Thomistic notion of science, the value of science, the relation of science to other fields, especially the humanistic, and finally, a plea for an integral view of human knowledge.

There is a schematic outline at the beginning of the book; each chapter is provided with a list of suggested readings, and there is a general bibliography.

THOREAU, HENRY D. *Selected Writings on Nature and Liberty.* Ed. with an introd. by O. Cargill. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952. 75¢

TILLICH, PAUL JOHANNES. *The Courage to Be.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 206. $3.00.

TOMLIN, ERIC WALTER FREDERIC. *The Great Philosophers.* Vol. II. *The Eastern World.* New York: A. A. Wyn, 1952. Pp. 299. $3.50.

This survey of the thought and the thinkers of the Eastern world embraces in successive chapters the Egyptians, Babylonia and Israel, Zoroaster, Hinduism, the Dubbha, Hindu systems, the Chinese sages, and Mohammed. The author is a well-informed and sympathetic historian. To help his Western readers, he tries to illustrate thoughts, movements, and events with Western parallels. Inevitably, in a work as brief as this, such comparisons may mislead, but the author has done as excellent a job as is possible under adverse circumstances. It must be emphasized that the author is fully aware of the fashionable trend to facile syncretism and that he resolutely prefers an understanding of differences. As a historian, the author does not obtrude his own judgments; but he does put forth the evidence on which philosophical judgment can be based. The book can be recommended to a much wider circle of readers than professional philosophers.

There is an index.

United Nations and Collective Action against Aggression, The. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 48. 20¢

VANDERBILT, A. T., and OTHERS. *Modern Education and Human Values.* Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1952. Pp. 134. $3.00.

This volume consists of five lectures delivered during the years 1950-51 and 1951-52. The paper of Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt, "The Law and Human Values," clearly sets out the need for law as the alternative to chaos, but simultaneously establishes the need for limitations on law-making and governmental functions in general, if law is to advance human values. Philip Rhys Adams, in his "For the Stability of the State," shows how art belongs to a broad human culture and shows its value for civilization and peace. Rabbi Samuel H. Goldenson, in his "The Moral Challenge to Education," brings out the very great importance of moral knowledge and virtue and shows their place in education. The paper of Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Values and Anthropological Relativism," is an important statement by one of the outstanding authorities in the field. He points out that anthropology was formerly obsessed with the idea of cultural relativism, but that with increasing knowledge it has become inescapably clear that there are universal human values as well as values determined by culture patterns. He finds the ground for these common values in the "common humanity" possessed by every man. The fifth paper, "Values in Teaching," by William G. Carr, deals with the teaching of various types of values, and does so in a superficial way. There is no index.

VAN LAER, HENRY. *Philosophico-Scientific Problems.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1953. About 150 pages. About $3.00; paper, about $2.25.

VAN MELSEN, ANDREW G. *The Philosophy of Nature.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; February, 1953. About 300 pages. $4.50; paper, $3.75.

VOEGELIN, ERIC. *The New Science of Politics.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 206. $3.00.

WILDER, RAYMOND L. *Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1952. Pp. 305. $5.75.

WISDOM, JOHN. *Other Minds.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. 259. $4.75.

This book contains a series of articles originally written for *Mind,* together with several other papers delivered before the Aristotelian Society. The point of departure is the meaning of questions like How do we know what is going on in other minds? Hovering in the

background and occasionally coming to the fore are the questions, Is there a soul? and Is there a God? The author's procedure is that of linguistic analysis, deriving much of its inspiration from Wittgenstein. Its involved and often rambling argumentation finally arrives at the position that metaphysical questions are meaningful, even if they are incapable of an answer in the ordinary sense. The concession seems to be a major one in the author's circle; perhaps the tools of grammar and logic can uncover no more.

There is no index; the footnotes make cross-references to the pagination of the original articles.

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CARRIÈRE, GASTON, O.M.I. *Précis de méthodologie à l'usage des étudiants en philosophie.* Ottawa: Les Editions de L'Université d'Ottawa, 1951. Pp. 104. Paper.

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